Subject: Some items for Extensions

From: "Douglas E. Engert" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2002 07:32:07 -0500

Hot listing of compromised principals across realms.  Section 3.3.3.1 
hints of this but does not say how one realm should contact another. 

Trace delegation. A server has no way to identify what hosts have been 
involved in authentication, especially if tickets have been forwarded. For 
example, A user might be allowed to access multiple sites from the home site,
but is not expected to use one site to attack another. (This is on a host 
bases, not just a realm bases.)

Replacing the use of address to watch for stolen tickets. (Goes along with 
the trace delegation.)  When a client uses a TGT, can the host key 
also be used to prove the TGT is being used from the correct host? This might 
need major changes to the way the client library interacts with the
system.

-- 

 Douglas E. Engert  <[email-masked]>
 Argonne National Laboratory
 9700 South Cass Avenue
 Argonne, Illinois  60439 
 (630) 252-5444

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2002 18:42:41 -0400

Doug, I thought we already had a consensus on what we were doing for
extensions.  Do you believe these features cannot be implemented by
the extension mechanisms we discussed?

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From: "Douglas E. Engert" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2002 09:41:38 -0500

> the extension mechanisms we discussed?

These don't have to be in extension, but maybe the follow on to extensions.
I was just bringing these concerns to the attention of the WG. 

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