Subject: Short Summary: KRB-WG IETF 56 - San Francisco

From: "Douglas E. Engert" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 22:02:48 -0600

[This summary is from my notes. Our scribe had a problem with his computer.]

The Kerberos WG met on 3/17/3 for about 1 and a half hours. In attendance
where approximately 53 people. 

The WG has concentrated on getting three drafts, Clarifications, KCRYPTO,
and AES to last call. Clarifications and AES are now ready for last call, KCRYPTO
needs some minor changes and should be ready in a few days.  Clarifications 
has already gone through a last call, so it expected to progress.  These three 
drafts need to progress together, and need to progress before many of the 
other drafts, including the Extensions draft. 

We have major revision of the change-set-password draft, which is being positioned
to work with Clarifications and Extensions. 

The IAKERB has been before the IESG, for over a year, but there has been some 
concerns about it. It is being withdrawn, and will be considered again if there is 
substantial interest. It should be update with regards to Clarifications. 

 

-- 

 Douglas E. Engert  <[email-masked]>
 Argonne National Laboratory
 9700 South Cass Avenue
 Argonne, Illinois  60439 
 (630) 252-5444

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 20:44:28 -0500

>>>>> "Douglas" == Douglas E Engert <[email-masked]> writes:

    Douglas> The IAKERB has been before the IESG, for over a year, but
    Douglas> there has been some concerns about it. It is being
    Douglas> withdrawn, and will be considered again if there is
    Douglas> substantial interest. It should be update with regards to
    Douglas> Clarifications.

I don't believe that iakerb is likely to have any issues with
clarifications, but the mode of iakerb that has reduced number of
round trips is likely to be incompatible with extensions because
extensions will integrity-protect  the request to make sure no changes are
made.

I believe that one of iakerb, EAP krb5, , EAP GSS should actually go
forward.  Eap krb5 has been sketched out (although not publically) but
does not really exist within the IETF context.  EAP GSS has
significant security issues and I hope it does not go forward at all.
Iakerb has significant esthetic issues that we have discussed to death
here.  I think we should wait until there is clear interest either
from the wireless or dialup community that they want to use Kerberos
and then work on one of these mechanisms.