Subject: DRAFT Minutes from IETF 61

From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2004 14:24:02 -0500

Following are DRAFT minutes for the Kerberos working group meeting at
IETF 61.  Please send any comments or corrections.  As changes are made,
the current version of these DRAFT minutes will be available at

http://grand.central.org/krb-wg/ietf61/krb-minutes.html

-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <[email-masked]>
   Co-chair, IETF Kerberos Working Group
   Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA

** IETF 61 - San Diego, CA
** Kerberos Working Group
** Wed, Nov 10, 2004 - 13:30-15;30

Chair:  Jeffrey Hutzelman
Scribes: Ken Hornstein, Jeffrey Altman, Wayne Morrison

* Agenda:
  + Preliminaries - Jeffrey Hutzelman (5 min)
  + Document Status - Jeffrey Hutzelman (5 min)
  + Extensions - Tom Yu (30 min)
  + PKINIT - Brian Tung (20 min)
  + OCSP for PKINIT - Larry Zhu (5 min)
  + SHA-1 - Ken Raeburn (5 min)
  + Preauthentication Framework - Sam Hartman (15 min)
  + Referrals - Larry Zhu (5 min)
  + Set/Change Password - Nico Williams (10 min)
  + Update Milestones - Chair and Participants (10 min)

* Document Status
  The chairs reviewed the status of several documents moving through
  the IETF process, and solicited comments on a couple of issues...

  + Crypto Framework
    - The crypto framework is near the top of the RFC-Editor queue,
      and is expected to enter author's 48 hours in the next few
      weeks.  There are two changes of note which will be made in
      that period.
    - The first change is the inclusion of the PRF as discussed at
      the last meeting and on the mailing list.
    - The second change is a correction to the description of how
      checksums are calculated for the DES enctypes.  As written,
      the document is inconsistent on whether checksums for these
      enctypes should cover padding.  Existing implementations do
      include padding in the checksums, and the document will be
      updated to specify that.

  + GSSAPI-CFX
    - The GSSAPI mechanism is still in the RFC-Editor queue.
    - Larry believes it is important to import into this document
      the text on name types from RFC1964 (with suitable updates
      to references), so that implementors who are only targeting
      "new" enctypes will be able to refer only to the new document.
      This has been discussed with Russ, who will run the change
      past the IESG if the WG agrees it is the right thing to do.
    - The issue of the naming text is still under discussion on the
      mailing list; please comment there.
    - There is not a ticket for the naming issue.

  + AES
    - The AES document was approved by the IESG and is now in the
      RFC-Editor queue.

  + Kerberos Clarifications
    - Clarifications was approved by the IESG and is now in the
      RFC-Editor queue.  We're going to try not to call it back...

  + GSSAPI Mechanism Extensions
    - Nico has two documents which relate to extending the Kerberos
      GSSAPI mechanism to support GSSAPI extensions being considered
      in KITTEN.
    - draft-williams-krb5-gssapi-domain-based-names-00.txt
    - draft-williams-krb5-gssapi-prf-00.txt
    - These documents will be worked on and discussed in the KITTEN
      working group.
    - Last call will occur in both KITTEN and KRB-WG.
    - Any KRB-WG participants who are interested in these documents
      but have no interest in the rest of KITTEN's work and would
      have a problem with the work happening there should contact the
      chair.

* Extensions
  + Tom Yu gave an overview of the current status of extensions and
    some of the open issues.

  + There was a brief discussion on the issue of identifying typed
    holes using relative OID's.
    - Tom indicated there had been some concerns about using relative
      rather than absolute OID's since it would restrict use to a
      subset of the OID namespace which would likely contain only
      an arc belonging to Kerberos.
    - Sam indicated that this had been discussed in Boulder, and that
      we should stick with the decision made there unless someone
      specifically asked to reopen the issue.
    - Someone asked whether built-in compression in encoding would
      help with OID's with long prefixes.  Tom indicated that the
      constant previs could be fairly long.
    - The chair reviewed the minutes from Boulder, and found that the
      issue had been discussed extensively and while the minutes made
      no mention of discussion specifically about absoulte-vs-relative,
      the decision to allow OID's at all did specifically mention
      relative OID's.
    - Discussion about OID assignment policy was deferred in Boulder,
      and again today.

  + There was a discussion on notational conventions for referring
    to ASN.1 types and fields in the body of the text.
    - Clarifications is inconsistent on this point.
    - Tom gave examples of 4 methods used in clarifications.
    - There was strong agreement that the ALL_CAPS method was not good.
    - Agreement to use single or double quotes at the editor's discretion.

  + Tom listed some issues which still need to be resolved, but which
    were not discussed at the meeting.

  + The document will be republished as a WG document after the I-D
    submission blackout period.  There was some discussion about the
    title and filename for the new document.

* PKINIT
  + Brian Tung gave an overview of the status of PKINIT.  Many of the
    open issues have now been closed.

  + DER vs BER has been resolved; thanks to all who participated.

  + Nico Williams will write up text for how to indicate PKINIT support.

  + Sam Hartman will write up comments on unauthenticated plaintext.

  + Larry Zhu will send a concrete proposal for client name mapping.

  + There was discussion of ticket #666, related to removing the
    encryptionCert field.
    - It was previously proposed that this field be removed unless
      someone could identify what it was for, and the field went
      away in pkinit-20.
    - Love pointed out that the field was for supporting the case
      where the client's main cert was signing-only.
    - The chair conducted a poll to determine whether there was a
      desire to support solving the signing-only certs problem by
      using encryption certs instead of DH.  The sense of the room
      was strongly in favor of considering DH sufficient.
    - This issue will be revisited and validated on the list.

  + There was discussion of ticket #526, which is about the issue of
    constraints on subjectAltName/OtherName/KRB5PrincipalName.
    - Love Hörnquist-Åstrand pointed out there is currently no way
      to have constraints on this field, so you can't do things like
      issue a CA cert that is going only for one realm.
    - Russ Housley pointed out this is because AnotherName can be
      extended arbitrarily, so there is no way to have a defined
      constraint.
    - Nico says if a client asserts a cname, it's up to the KDC to
      implement policy.
    - Love asks if an ASN.1-encoded structure as the value for the
      otherName is a good idea, or if it should just be a string.
      There does not seem to be agreement for a change.
    - Sam Hartman says the strongest argument agsint doing constraints
      is that the KDC is alwasys in the loop and can enforce any
      name constraints it wants.
    - Russ Housley says he finds KDC-in-the-loop a compelling argument.
    - Jeffrey Hutzelman asked whether a constraint type defined in the
      future could be made critical.
    - Russ checked the specs, and determined that name constraints
      MUST be critical.
    - This issue can be addressed in the future without problems.

  + Sam Hartman made a proposal for handling of checksums in PKINIT
    - The basic problem is that Kerberos checksums aren't intended to
      be used for what PKINIT uses them for.  They're good for Kerberos
      operations, not random oracle DH operations.  Some people have
      suggested that kcrypto should provide suitable operations; Sam
      has objected.  Anything doing DH already has to do DH group
      negotiation.  Ken Raeburn went through the work of writing up
      unkeyed SHA-1, but discovered it didn't fit the model.
    - The proposal is to use a raw SHA-1 checksum now, and add a way
      to do negotiation later.
    - Sense of the room was in favor of not doing negotation now.
      This will be revisited and validated on the mailing list.

* OCSP for PKINIT
  + Larry Zhu gave a presentation on the status of OCSP for PKINIT.
  + Draft was sent to the list, but there hasn't been any feedback.
    Please read and post comments.
  + Draft will be last called soon.

* SHA-1
  + There was no presentation on the SHA-1 document.  Based on the
    direction we've chosen for PKINIT, this document will likely be
    allowed to expire.

* Preauthentication Framework
  + Sam Hartman talked briefly on the preauth framework.  He is at the
    point where he needs a co-editor.

  + There was dicussions as to which Kerberos rev to target.
    - Sam asked whether we expect there to be enough clarifications-era
      preauth mechanisms that the framework will be needed.
    - Nico thinks preauth should target extensions.
    - Agreement seems to be to target extensions only

  + This is low priority for now.

* Referrals
  + Larry Zhu gave a presentation on the current state of Referrals.
    He believes the document is close to ready for last call, but it
    has not received enough review.

* Set/Change Password
  + Nico Williams gave a non-presentation on the Set/Change Password
    document.  There have been no interesting developments since the
    last meeting.  The major at the issue at the moment is still
    localization.

* Update Milestones
  + The following new and updated milestones were agreed on:
    DONE      Complete first draft of Pre-auth framework
    DONE      Complete first draft of Extensions
    Nov 2004  Last call on PKINIT
    Nov 2004  Last call on OCSP for PKINIT
    Feb 2005  Concensus on direction for Change/Set password
    Mar 2005  Major issues resolved on Extensions
    Jun 2005  Last call on Extensions
    Jun 2005  Last call on Referrals
    Sep 2005  Last call on Change/Set password
    Sep 2005  Charter Review
    DROP      Submit Pre-auth Framework document to IESG...
    DROP      Submit PKCROSS to IESG...

---

From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2004 15:38:13 -0500

> http://grand.central.org/krb-wg/ietf61/krb-minutes.html

I have seen no comments on these minutes.  Please send me any changes or
corrections by 17:00 EST (UTC-5) on Friday, 5-Dec-2004.  If no comments
are received by that time, I will take the minutes which appear at the 
above URL as final, and submit them to be included in the IETF61 
proceedings.

-- Jeff