Subject: [Ietf-krb-wg] Publication Request: draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-15.txt (fwd)

From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2009 16:25:47 -0500

------------ Forwarded Message ------------
Date: Tuesday, December 01, 2009 04:24:57 PM -0500
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Publication Request: draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-15.txt

This is a request to the IESG to approve publication of
"A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-15.txt, as a Standards-Track RFC.
This document is a product of the Kerberos Working Group.

(1.a)  Who is the Document Shepherd for this document?  Has the
       Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
       document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
       version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

       >> The Document Shepherd for this document is Jeffrey Hutzelman,
       >> <[email-masked]>.  I have reviewed this document, and I believe
       >> it is ready for IETF-wide review and publication as a
       >> Proposed Standard.

(1.b)  Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
       and from key non-WG members?  Does the Document Shepherd have
       any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
       have been performed?

       >> This document has received review both within the working group
       >> and from key experts outside the working group.  Any issues raised
       >> have been resolved.

(1.c)  Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
       needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
       e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
       AAA, internationalization or XML?

       >> I don't believe any particular outside review is required.
       >> Of course, more review is always welcome.

(1.d)  Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
       issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
       and/or the IESG should be aware of?  For example, perhaps he
       or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
       has concerns whether there really is a need for it.  In any
       event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
       that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
       concerns here.  Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
       been filed?  If so, please include a reference to the
       disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
       this issue.

       >> I have no concerns.
       >> No IPR disclosures related to this document have been filed.

(1.e)  How solid is the WG consensus behind this document?  Does it
       represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
       others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
       agree with it?

       >> There is concensus within the working group to publish this
       >> document on the standards track.  I believe there is strong
       >> consensus for the preauthentication model and framework
       >> described in this document.
       >>
       >> The FAST mechanism described in section 6.4 is conceptually
       >> separable from the rest of the document, and so I discuss
       >> it separately here.  There is consensus in the working group
       >> to publish this mechanism, and on the details of its design,
       >> at least among those who have contributed to or reviewed it.
       >> There is a somewhat rougher consensus to place this mechanism
       >> on the standards track and to require its implementation by
       >> Kerberos implementations conforming to the preauth framework.
       >>
       >> It is worth noting that a partial overlap exists between the
       >> functionality of the FAST mechanism, which provides an encrypted
       >> tunnel to protect exchange of preauthentication data between
       >> a client and KDC, and that of the Kerberos STARTTLS extension,
       >> draft-josefsson-kerberos5-starttls-07.txt, which is also a
       >> document of this working group.

(1.f)  Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
       discontent?  If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
       separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director.  (It
       should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
       entered into the ID Tracker.)

       >> There have been no expressions of discontent.

(1.g)  Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
       document satisfies all ID nits?  (See
       http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
       http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/).  Boilerplate checks are
       not enough; this check needs to be thorough.  Has the document
       met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
       Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

       >> This document has been run through the idnits tool, and was
       >> reviewed manually for compliance with requirements not checked
       >> by the automatic tool.  No additional formal review criteria
       >> apply to this document.
       >>
       >> In addition to RFC2119 requirements language, this document
       >> contains numerous uses of lowercase "may", "should", and
       >> "required", which are not intended to carry the RFC2119
       >> meanings of the uppercase terms.  These are used in contexts
       >> where requirements language is neither intended or appropriate,
       >> such as advice to the reader or to future pre-authentication
       >> mechanism designers, when discussing scenarios which provide
       >> background for a design decision or requirement, or when
       >> discussion potential constraints imposed by policy rather
       >> than by the protocol.

(1.h)  Has the document split its references into normative and
       informative?  Are there normative references to documents that
       are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
       state?  If such normative references exist, what is the
       strategy for their completion?  Are there normative references
       that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]?  If
       so, list these downward references to support the Area
       Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

       >> References have been split appropriately.
       >> This document contains a normative reference to
       >> draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon, which is awaiting a new WGLC

(1.i)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
       consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
       of the document?  If the document specifies protocol
       extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
       registries?  Are the IANA registries clearly identified?  If
       the document creates a new registry, does it define the
       proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
       procedure for future registrations?  Does it suggest a
       reasonable name for the new registry?  See [RFC2434].  If the
       document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
       conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
       can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

       >> This document creates three new registries, for Kerberos
       >> preauthentication and typed-data types, for FAST armor types,
       >> and for FAST options.  The first creates an IANA registry
       >> for a namespace previously managed directly by the Kerberos
       >> working group; the others are new namespaces created by this
       >> document.  In all three cases, suitable names are suggested,
       >> initial contents included, and an appropriate registration
       >> policy is specified.

       >> The current maintainer of the PA-DATA/TYPED-DATA registry,
       >> which this document turns over to IANA, is in the process of
       >> reconciling the initial IANA registry contents contained in
       >> this document with his existing records.  We expect this will
       >> result in minor changes to the initial registry contents by
       >> the time the final document is published.

       >> This document allocates new values in several namespaces which
       >> are currently managed directly by the Kerberos working group
       >> rather than as IANA registries.  Transferring these registries
       >> to IANA control is a work in progress but is not the subject
       >> of this document.

(1.j)  Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
       document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
       code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
       an automated checker?

       >> This document contains an ASN.1 module, which in the current
       >> version does not compile.  Corrections have been made in the
       >> author's copy and will be included the next update (presumably,
       >> along with changes to address any issues raised during IETF
       >> Last Call).

(1.k)  The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
       Announcement Write-Up.  Please provide such a Document
       Announcement Write-Up?  Recent examples can be found in the
       "Action" announcements for approved documents.  The approval
       announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

   Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of principals
   (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open network.
   The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called pre-authentication
   for proving the identity of a principal and for better protecting the
   long-term secrets of the principal.

   This document describes a model for Kerberos pre-authentication
   mechanisms.  The model describes what state in the Kerberos request a
   pre-authentication mechanism is likely to change.  It also describes
   how multiple pre-authentication mechanisms used in the same request
   will interact.

   This document also provides common tools needed by multiple pre-
   authentication mechanisms.  One of these tools is a secure channel
   between the client and the KDC with a reply key strengthening
   mechanism; this secure channel can be used to protect the
   authentication exchange thus eliminate offline dictionary attacks.
   With these tools, it is relatively straightforward to chain multiple
   authentication mechanisms, utilize a different key management system,
   or support a new key agreement algorithm.

Working Group Summary

   This document represents the consensus of the Kerberos Working Group.

Document Quality

   Multiple vendors have indicated that they plan to implement and ship
   the extensions described in this document or have already begun to
   do so.

Personnel

   The Document Shepherd for this document is Jeffrey Hutzelman.
   The responsible Area Director is Tim Polk.

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