Subject: [Ietf-krb-wg] Suggestions for draft-lha-des-die-die-die

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2010 17:01:56 -0400 (EDT)

hi.  I think it would be great if this draft could move RFC 1510 to
historic and move RFC 2712 (or whatever TLS ciphersuites for Kerberos
are) to historic.

I'd be happy to write text if others agree.

I do not want to delay this draft in order to accomplish these goals;
if Love or the chairs think it will slow things down I'd rather do
that independently.

--Sam
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From: Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 02 Jul 2010 14:43:43 +0200

> historic and move RFC 2712 (or whatever TLS ciphersuites for Kerberos

+1 for RFC 1510.  But how is Love's draft (about DES) related to the
status of RFC 2712?  RFC 2712 specify several non-DES modes, and I don't
see us moving them to historic now.

I would support moving 2712 to historic (it is broken for other reasons)
but I think it would be clearer to have in a separate document.  That
document would give me me canonical answer to frequent requests to add
support for Kerberos ciphers to GnuTLS...

OTOH, I would also be interested to work on a modern variant of RFC
2712.  There have been several attempts to standardize GSS-API within
TLS but they have all failed or fizzled out, but the user need remains.
I'm beginning to think that a non-GSS-API Kerberos solution for TLS,
similar to RFC 2712 but less broken, is warranted at this point.
Possibly it could be based on the TLS PSK ciphers rather than adding
even more ciphers.

/Simon

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 02 Jul 2010 12:36:23 -0400

>>>>> "Simon" == Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]> writes:

    Simon> Sam Hartman <[email-masked]> writes:
    >> hi.  I think it would be great if this draft could move RFC 1510
    >> to historic and move RFC 2712 (or whatever TLS ciphersuites for
    >> Kerberos are) to historic.

    Simon> +1 for RFC 1510.  But how is Love's draft (about DES) related
    Simon> to the status of RFC 2712?  RFC 2712 specify several non-DES
    Simon> modes, and I don't see us moving them to historic now.

I didn't think it had non-DES modes.  IN particular, I didn't think it
supported non-DES Kerberos keys.  I withdraw my suggestion for 2712.

(I too agree that a document explicitly moving it to historic because it
is broken would be good.  I have time to review but not write such a
document.)
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From: Simon Josefsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 04 Jul 2010 10:28:11 +0200

> supported non-DES Kerberos keys.  I withdraw my suggestion for 2712.

Browsing RFC 2712 it isn't completely clear to me, but I don't see
anything obvious that would make it impossible to use it with, say, AES
Kerberos keys.  Or is there?  I haven't implemented it, so I am not
certain.

> is broken would be good.  I have time to review but not write such a

Do we have a complete list of known brokenness with it?  My list is:

* The DES+RC4+IDEA+EXPORT ciphers are weak and shouldn't be used.  That
  leaves only 3DES.

* It does not provide Kerberos mutual authentication via AP-REP.

/Simon

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From: Love Hörnquist Åstrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jul 2010 12:19:31 -0700

Sam,

> I'd be happy to write text if others agree.

I think I rather would see a separate document since today this document doesn't touch rfc1510.

That said, if it could be done in a simple way, I'm all for it.

RFC2712 should be dealt with another way (as you already agreed).

Love

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From: "Henry B. Hotz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 15:54:59 -0700

> Possibly it could be based on the TLS PSK ciphers rather than adding

+1

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The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
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From: Nicolas Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 18:24:49 -0500

> > Possibly it could be based on the TLS PSK ciphers rather than adding

See draft-williams-tls-app-sasl-opt-03.txt.

Summary: do SASL mechanism negotiation via TLS Hello messages, then
piggyback the first SASL authentication message round-trip on the
remaining TLS handshake messages.

Channel binding, of course, would be used, and, strangely enough, can be
used, even this early, because the TLS Finished message to be used as
channel binding has already been generated or received by the time the
SASL mechanism starts.  This approach does imply TLS APIs with callbacks
so the application can start SASL at the right time.

I believe my approach is more likely to succeed in terms of TLS WG
politics as it doesn't actually modify TLS or its state machine.
Instead it uses normal TLS extensions and application protocol to do the
new thing, and it uses TLS Hellos to negotiate both.

Nico
--

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From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 2010 09:53:56 -0400

>>>>> "Love" == Love Hörnquist Åstrand <[email-masked]> writes:

    Love> Sam,
    >> I'd be happy to write text if others agree.

    Love> I think I rather would see a separate document since today
    Love> this document doesn't touch rfc1510.

    Love> That said, if it could be done in a simple way, I'm all for
    Love> it.

Add the following sentence to the abstract and introduction:

because the version of Kerberos specified in RFC 1510 only supports DES
and has been replaced by RFC 4120, RFC 1510 is reclassified as historic.

Jeff will need to do slightly more when he does the draft submission,
namely point that out to Tim and include it in the draft protocol
action, but that's all.
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From: Love Hörnquist Åstrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 2010 15:25:38 -0700

Thanks for the text contribution, since simon agreed too I updated the draft and published -05

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