Subject: Stray Poll: Finger-prints in QCs

From: "Anders Rundgren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1999 22:30:28 -0000

All,
This discussion can continue forever without getting anywhere so I
propose a short-cut.  The alternatives are:

1.  Support it as an option

2.  PKIX should limit direct support of information that could deprive privacy regardless if some parties want it

3.  Finger-prints have no proved value or are still technically immature

Anders

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From: Tony Bartoletti <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 1999 14:38:40 -0800

Anders,

Putting philosophy aside, I am not against the inclusion of any
option, technically.  But I confess to being behind the curve on
the distinctions made regarding "options" and "future extensibility".

Ilam asked why the profile limits discussion to "human-on-hand"
biometric authentication.  This makes sense, as Steven Kent noted.
That is, in remote authentication, biometric data is only useful
if it is absolutely secret.  But then, ANYTHING absolutely secret
would do just as well, and biometric data would certainly NOT be
the best choice.  I might pick up your fingerprints or DNA trace
from an unwashed drinking glass.  But you take better care with
your secret keys, I suppose.

Ilam also asked why the limitation to a hash.  Here, I agree that
size limitations seem short-sighted.  Bob Jueneman's "JPG of my cat"
comes to mind.  Why not allow for unlimited size, given systems that
can handle it.

Denis Pinkas states that X509V3 allows extensions that can be
"defined later, when it becomes appropriate".  So, when does it
become appropriate?  And can such extensions be added unilaterally
by the parties that would use them?  Are we arguing that they need
to be profiled now, to provide a consistent groundwork?

Someone mentioned that the hash is sufficient, since the actual
data could just "tag along" with the cert, if required.  But there
needs to be a standard even for this kind of operation.  Is there?

It may be marginally outside the PKIX charter to show concern
beyond the keys/certificates themselves.  Is s/mime a more
appropriate forum for this concern?

Have I posed enough questions? ;)

___tony___

>3.  Finger-prints have no proved value or are still technically immature

Tony Bartoletti                                             LL
IOWA Center                                              LL LL
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory                LL LL LL
PO Box 808, L - 089                                   LL LL LL
Livermore, CA 94551-9900                              LL LL LLLLLLLL
phone: 925-422-3881   fax: 925-423-8081               LL LLLLLLLL
email: [email-masked]                                   LLLLLLLL

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From: Michael Sierchio <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 1999 17:10:22 -0800

> 1.  Support it as an option

see final comments below.

> 2.  PKIX should limit direct support of information that could deprive privacy regardless if some parties want it

Definitely. 

> 3.  Finger-prints have no proved value or are still technically immature

A substantial percentage of the population in the (ethnically diverse) US
have no readable fingerprints.  No encoding of biometric data
exists which would represent an invariant reference -- all biometric
data are subject not only to variances in the metric apparatus, but
also in the subject.  Therefore,  biometric data could only reasonably
accomodated by reference.  Which raises the question of whether there
can be a trusted repository of such data.  I suggest not.

There are undoubtedly applications in which reference to biometric data
for the purposes of authentication might be desireable,  and in which
privacy concerns are not relevant (military installations, etc.).  I
cannot comprehend why anyone thinks that the binding of biometric data
to a unique person should be embedded in a certificate.  

-- 
QUI ME AMET, CANEM MEUM ETIAM AMET