Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item

From: "Blake Ramsdell" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 May 1999 17:33:09 -0700

Based on my understanding of Jim's original message, Jim would like to use
the OID:

sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}

That is, within the SMIMECapability structure, the capabilityID would be set
to sMIMECapabilitiesVersions, which is a new OID that Jim has proposed under
the sMIMECapabilities arc.

Blake

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 2:05 PM
> To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
> Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
> Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item
> 
> 
> Jim:
> 
> Yes.  MSG-07 includes the follwoing ASN.1.  Which OID are you 
> using for
> capabilityID to express S/MIME version preference?
> 
> -- S/MIME Capabilities provides a method of broadcasting the symetric
> capabilities
> --      understood.  Algorithms should be ordered by 
> preference and grouped
> by type
> 
> smimeCapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
>    {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}
> 
> SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
>    capabilityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>    parameters ANY DEFINED BY capabilityID OPTIONAL }
> 
> SMIMECapabilities ::= SEQUENCE OF SMIMECapability
> 
> 
> Russ
> 
>  At 04:39 PM 5/25/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
> >Russ,
> >
> >I think the question you are asking is what is the OID for
> >sMIMECapabilities?  It is already defined as:
> >sMIMECapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
> >--    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}  -- -- [MSG]
> >
> >If this is not the question you are asking, please be more explicit.
> >
> >jim
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 1:52 PM
> >To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
> >Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
> >Subject: Re: New SMime Capabilities item
> >
> >
> >Jim:
> >
> >What OID are you using?
> >
> >Russ
> >
> >
> >At 07:59 PM 5/11/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
> >>Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section 
> of the OIDs
> >>document on IMC.ORG.
> >>
> >>sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
> >>SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
> >>--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
> >>specifications
> >>--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two 
> items legal
> >values
> >>are
> >>--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   
> If the item is
> >>missing from a
> >>--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.
> >>
> >>
> >>The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 
> clients will probably
> >>not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  
> Specifically receipient
> >>infos other than key transport and may not be able to 
> decrypt the message
> >at
> >>all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.
> >>
> >>jim
> >>
> 
> 

From: "Blake Ramsdell" <[email-masked]>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <[email-masked]>, "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
cc: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item
Date: Wed, 26 May 1999 17:33:09 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

Based on my understanding of Jim's original message, Jim would like to use
the OID:

sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}

That is, within the SMIMECapability structure, the capabilityID would be set
to sMIMECapabilitiesVersions, which is a new OID that Jim has proposed under
the sMIMECapabilities arc.

Blake

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 1999 2:05 PM
> To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
> Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
> Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item
> 
> 
> Jim:
> 
> Yes.  MSG-07 includes the follwoing ASN.1.  Which OID are you 
> using for
> capabilityID to express S/MIME version preference?
> 
> -- S/MIME Capabilities provides a method of broadcasting the symetric
> capabilities
> --      understood.  Algorithms should be ordered by 
> preference and grouped
> by type
> 
> smimeCapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
>    {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}
> 
> SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
>    capabilityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
>    parameters ANY DEFINED BY capabilityID OPTIONAL }
> 
> SMIMECapabilities ::= SEQUENCE OF SMIMECapability
> 
> 
> Russ
> 
>  At 04:39 PM 5/25/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
> >Russ,
> >
> >I think the question you are asking is what is the OID for
> >sMIMECapabilities?  It is already defined as:
> >sMIMECapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
> >--    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}  -- -- [MSG]
> >
> >If this is not the question you are asking, please be more explicit.
> >
> >jim
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 1:52 PM
> >To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
> >Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
> >Subject: Re: New SMime Capabilities item
> >
> >
> >Jim:
> >
> >What OID are you using?
> >
> >Russ
> >
> >
> >At 07:59 PM 5/11/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
> >>Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section 
> of the OIDs
> >>document on IMC.ORG.
> >>
> >>sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
> >>SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
> >>--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
> >>specifications
> >>--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two 
> items legal
> >values
> >>are
> >>--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   
> If the item is
> >>missing from a
> >>--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.
> >>
> >>
> >>The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 
> clients will probably
> >>not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  
> Specifically receipient
> >>infos other than key transport and may not be able to 
> decrypt the message
> >at
> >>all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.
> >>
> >>jim
> >>
> 
> 

Date: Wed, 26 May 1999 17:05:14 -0400
To: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item
Cc: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim:

Yes.  MSG-07 includes the follwoing ASN.1.  Which OID are you using for
capabilityID to express S/MIME version preference?

-- S/MIME Capabilities provides a method of broadcasting the symetric
capabilities
--      understood.  Algorithms should be ordered by preference and grouped
by type

smimeCapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
   {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}

SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
   capabilityID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   parameters ANY DEFINED BY capabilityID OPTIONAL }

SMIMECapabilities ::= SEQUENCE OF SMIMECapability

Russ

 At 04:39 PM 5/25/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>Russ,
>
>I think the question you are asking is what is the OID for
>sMIMECapabilities?  It is already defined as:
>sMIMECapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
>--    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}  -- -- [MSG]
>
>If this is not the question you are asking, please be more explicit.
>
>jim
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
>Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 1:52 PM
>To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
>Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
>Subject: Re: New SMime Capabilities item
>
>
>Jim:
>
>What OID are you using?
>
>Russ
>
>
>At 07:59 PM 5/11/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>>Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section of the OIDs
>>document on IMC.ORG.
>>
>>sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
>>SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
>>--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
>>specifications
>>--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two items legal
>values
>>are
>>--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   If the item is
>>missing from a
>>--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.
>>
>>
>>The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 clients will probably
>>not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  Specifically receipient
>>infos other than key transport and may not be able to decrypt the message
>at
>>all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.
>>
>>jim
>>

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <[email-masked]>, "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: New SMime Capabilities item
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 16:39:31 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

Russ,

I think the question you are asking is what is the OID for
sMIMECapabilities?  It is already defined as:
sMIMECapabilities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
--    us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 15}  -- -- [MSG]

If this is not the question you are asking, please be more explicit.

jim

-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 1999 1:52 PM
To: Jim Schaad (Exchange)
Cc: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
Subject: Re: New SMime Capabilities item

Jim:

What OID are you using?

Russ

At 07:59 PM 5/11/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section of the OIDs
>document on IMC.ORG.
>
>sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
>SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
>--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
>specifications
>--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two items legal
values
>are
>--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   If the item is
>missing from a
>--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.
>
>
>The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 clients will probably
>not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  Specifically receipient
>infos other than key transport and may not be able to decrypt the message
at
>all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.
>
>jim
>

Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 16:51:54 -0400
To: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New SMime Capabilities item
Cc: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim:

What OID are you using?

Russ

At 07:59 PM 5/11/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section of the OIDs
>document on IMC.ORG.
>
>sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
>SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
>--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
>specifications
>--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two items legal values
>are
>--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   If the item is
>missing from a
>--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.
>
>
>The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 clients will probably
>not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  Specifically receipient
>infos other than key transport and may not be able to decrypt the message at
>all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.
>
>jim
>

To: IETF-Announce: ;
Cc: [email-masked]
From: [email-masked]
Reply-to: [email-masked]
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 10:01:21 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions
	Author(s)	: J. Pawling
	Filename	: draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt
	Pages		: 10
	Date		: 24-May-99
	
This document describes the conventions for using the Key Exchange 
Algorithm (KEA) and SKIPJACK encryption algorithm in conjunction with the Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] enveloped-data and encrypted-data 
content types.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
type "cd internet-drafts" and then
	"get draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt".

A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 
or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.

Send a message to:
	[email-masked].
In the body type:
	"FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt".
	
NOTE:	The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
	MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
	feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
	command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
	a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
	exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
	"multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
	up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
	how to manipulate these messages.

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess"

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	access-type="mail-server";
	server="[email-masked]"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<[email-masked]>

ENCODING mime
FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt

--OtherAccess
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-01.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

Content-Type: text/plain
Content-ID:	<[email-masked]>

--OtherAccess--

--NextPart--

Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 19:26:52 -0400 (EDT)
From: "David M. Balenson" <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: REMINDER: CFP: ISOC Year 2000 Netw. & Distr. Sys. Security Symp. (NDSS 2000)
Sender: [email-masked]

            C  A  L  L       F  O  R       P  A  P  E  R  S

                          The Internet Society
           Year 2000 Network and Distributed System Security 
                         Symposium (NDSS 2000)

             Catamaran Resort Hotel, San Diego, California
                           February 2-4, 2000

IMPORTANT DATES:

  Paper and panel submissions due: June 16, 1999
  Author notification: August 17, 1999
  Final versions of papers and panels due: October 15, 1999

GOAL: 

  This symposium aims to foster information exchange among researchers
  and practitioners of network and distributed system security
  services.  The intended audience includes those who are interested
  in practical aspects of network and distributed system security,
  with the focus on actual system design and implementation, rather
  than theory. A major goal of the symposium is to encourage and
  enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the
  state of available security technology.  The proceedings of the
  symposium will be published by the Internet Society.

  Submissions are solicited for, but are not limited to, the
  following topics:

  * Secure Electronic Commerce, e.g., payment, barter, EDI,
    notarization/timestamping, endorsement and licensing.
  * Intellectual Property Protection: protocols, schemas,
    implementations, metering, watermarking, other forms of rights
    management.
  * Implementation, deployment and management of network security
    policies.
  * Integrating Security in Internet protocols: routing, naming,
    TCP/IP, multicast, network management, and, of course, the Web.
  * Attack-resistant protocols and services.
  * Special problems and case studies: e.g. interplay and tradeoffs
    between security and efficiency, usability, reliability and cost.
  * Security for collaborative applications and services: tele- and
    video-conferencing, groupwork, etc.
  * Fundamental services: authentication, data integrity,
    confidentiality, authorization, non-repudiation, and availability.
  * Supporting mechanisms and APIs: key management and certification,
    revocation, audit trails and accountability.
  * Integrating security services with system and application security
    facilities and protocols, e.g., message handling, file
    transport/access, directories, time synchronization, data base
    management, boot services, mobile computing.
  * Security for emerging technologies -- sensor networks, specialized
    testbeds, wireless/mobile (and ad hoc) networks, personal
    communication systems, and large heterogeneous distributed systems.
  * Intrusion Avoidance, Detection, and Response: systems, experiences
    and architectures
  * Network Perimeter Controls: firewalls, packet filters, application
    gateways.

BEST PAPER AWARD:

  A best paper award will be introduced at NDSS 2000. This award will
  be presented at the symposium to the authors of the best paper to
  be selected by the program committee.

GENERAL CHAIR:
  Stephen Welke, Trusted Computer Solutions

PROGRAM CO-CHAIRS:
  Gene Tsudik, USC / Information Sciences Institute
  Avi Rubin, AT&T Labs - Research

TUTORIAL CHAIR:
  Doug Maughan, NSA / DARPA

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:
  Bill Cheswick, Lucent Bell Labs  
  Marc Dacier, IBM Research Zurich 
  Jim Ellis, CMU / CERT
  Carl Ellison, Intel   
  Ed Felten, Princeton  
  Virgil Gligor, UMD College Park 
  Thomas Hardjono, Bay Networks/Nortel
  Cynthia Irvine, Naval Postgraduate School
  Charlie Kaufman,  Iris Associates
  Dave Kormann, AT&T Labs - Research 
  Hugo Krawczyk, Technion and IBM
  Carl Landwehr, Naval Research Lab
  Doug Maughan, NSA / DARPA   
  Gary McGraw, Reliable Software Technologies  
  Sandra Murphy, TIS Labs at Network Associates   
  Clifford Neuman, USC / Information Sciences Institute
  Paul Van Oorschot, Entrust
  Sami Saydjari, DARPA ISO 
  David Wagner, UC Berkeley   
  Bennet Yee, UC San Diego

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS CHAIR:
  Thomas Hutton, San Diego Supercomputer Center

PUBLICATIONS CHAIR:
  John Kochmar, SEI

PUBLICITY CHAIR:
  David Balenson, TIS Labs at Network Associates   

LOGISTICS CHAIR:
  Carla Rosenfeld, Internet Society

REGISTRATIONS CHAIR
  Beth Strait, Internet Society

SUBMISSIONS: 

  The committee invites both technical papers and panel proposals.
  Technical papers should be at most 20 pages long. Panel proposals
  should be at most two pages and should describe the topic, identify
  the panel chair, explain the format of the panel, and list three
  to four potential panelists.  Technical papers will appear in
  the proceedings. A description of each panel will appear in the
  proceedings, and may -- at the discretion of the panel chair --
  include written position statements from the panelists.

  Each submission must contain a separate title page with the type
  of submission (paper or panel), the title or topic, the names of
  the author(s), organizational affiliation(s), telephone and FAX
  numbers, postal addresses, e-mail addresses, and must specify
  the contact author in case of multi-author submissions. The names
  of authors, affiliations, and other identifying information should
  appear only on the separate title page.

  Submissions must be received by June 16, 1999, and must be made
  via electronic mail in either PostScript or ASCII format.  If
  the committee is unable to print a PostScript submission, a
  hardcopy will be requested. Therefore, PostScript submissions
  must arrive well before the deadline.

  All submissions and program related correspondence (only) should
  be directed to the program chair:

        Gene Tsudik     
        USC Information Sciences Institute      
        4676 Admiralty Way      
        Marina Del Rey, CA 90292        
        Email: [email-masked]
        TEL: +1 (310) 822-1511 ext 329
        FAX: +1 (310) 823-6714 

  Dates, final call for papers, advance program, and registration
  information will be available soon at the URL: httl//www.isoc.org/ndss2000.

  Each submission will be acknowledged by e-mail.  If acknowledgment
  is not received within seven days, please contact the program
  chair as indicated above.  Authors and panelists will be notified
  of acceptance by August 17, 1999.  Instructions for preparing
  camera-ready copy for the proceedings will be sent at that time.
  The camera-ready copy must be received by October 15, 1999.

Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 17:08:45 +0100
From: Dr Stephen Henson <[email-masked]>
Organization: Dr S N Henson
To: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: X9.42 comments.
Sender: [email-masked]

Couple of additional comments all about section 2.2.1.1 [note I've
retained the original X9.42 text even in places where I've claimed other
problems in a previous message].

Firstly the algorithm for calculating 'q' in step 4 will produce a value
of 'q' with lots of zero bits if m is not a multiple of 160. For example
if m=319 it will have 158 zero bits.

This can be readily fixed by setting 
m' = (m + 159)/160 
in step 3 and in step 5: 
q = U mod 2^m
initially and then set the most and least signinificant bits as before.

The second issue may not be a problem as such.

The use of SEED doesn't quite follow the FIPS-186 usage. Let me
explain...

At several points FIPS-186 uses SHA[(SEED+k)mod 2^g] for the generation
of prime number candidates. The way it uses it obeys two rules.

1. Each value of k is used only once.
2. The order of use is such that each value of k is used in sequence.

(1) may have some cryptographic reason to ensure the same pseudo random
data is not re-used.

(2) makes implementation particularly easy: an implementer only needs
retain a copy of SEED+k and increment it every time it is used. This
property is not immediately apparent because of the way FIPS-186 is
written but it goes something like this:

All this refers to Appendix 2.2 FIPS-186:

Step 2. first uses SEED. It makes use of SEED and SEED+1 to calculate U
(and ultimately a candidate q). 

If q is not prime a new SEED is tried otherwise p is constructed from:

Vk = SHA[(SEED + offset + k) mod 2^g ].

For values of k = 0,...,n, and offset initially is 2.

This means that SEED+2, SEED+3, ... SEED+n+2 are used to ultimately
build a candidate p. If this is not successful (n+1) is added to offset
making it n+3 and each Vk calculated again. As can be seen the value of
SEED is incremented on each use.

The generalisation in X9.42 obeys neither rule if m' > 1. In this case:

4. for i = 0 to m' - 1

U = U + SHA[SEED + i] XOR SHA[(SEED + m' + i) mod 2^160] * 2^(160 * i)

This ends up using SEED and SEED+m'+1 (which is compatible with FIPS186
if m'=1) however if m'=3 say this uses SEED, SEED+3, SEED+1, SEED+4,
SEED+2, SEED+5

Then when we get to step 9 we end up using SEED+2, SEED+3,... and so on.

This ends up re-using the same data and as is apparent this is not in
order.

If the algorithm used is made to be compatible with something else then
not much can be done. If we do have some control over it and the same
rules as FIPS-186 are desired then these changes should work:

Step 4.

4. for i = 0 to m' - 1

U = U + SHA[SEED + 2*i] XOR SHA[(SEED + 2*i + 1) mod 2^160] * 2^(160 *
i)

Step 8.

Let counter=0 and offset = 2*m'

Assuming I haven't made some stupid slip this should end up incrementing
SEED each time and only using each value once. As before this retains
compatability with FIPS-186 if m=160 (m'=1).

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [email-masked] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Business Email: [email-masked] PGP key: via homepage.

Date: Mon, 24 May 1999 10:45:37 -0400
To: [email-masked]
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Cc: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

Bob:

In CMS Section 12.3.2, RSA Key Management is a "should" implement
algorithm.  As a result of an editorial error, in CMS Section 12.2, RSA
Signature is a "may" implement algorithm.  I thought that they had the same
"should" status.  This would be consistent with the MSG document.

We went through great pains to include support many, many algorithms in
CMS.  The  "must" implement algorithms to provide a set of interoperable
strong algorithms.  The "should" implement algorithms provide backward
compatibility with S/MIMEv2.  Any other algorithm is considered a "may"
implement algorithm. RSA with OAEP falls into this "may" implement category.

The IETF consistently includes strong algorithms in standards.  If you wish
to discuss this policy, please discuss it in a broader context (not just
S/MIME) with the IETF Security Area Directors (Jeff Schiller and Marcus
Leech).  I have CCed them on this e-mail message, so you have their
addresses.  I do not consider this an approprate topic for the S/MIME mail
list.

I wish you had raised this inconsistency during CMS and MSG Last Call.  The
IESG has approved these documents.  I hope you will raise this topic again
when the documents are considered for Draft Standard status.

Russ
  S/MIME WG Chair  &
  CMS Document Editor

At 12:34 PM 5/18/99 -0600, Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
>I sincerely regret not having had sufficient time to review the S/MIME v3
>specs in detail during last call and prior to their moving to Proposed
>Standard, but I believe that there are several changes that absolutely
>must be made before they can progress to final Standard.
>
>Regarding the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification,
>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, I believe that all MUSTs and SHOULDs
>regarding specific cryptographic algorithms should be removed from this
>document, and contained only in the Cryptographic Message Syntax document.
>I can see no reason at all why such things should be specified twice -- it
>just makes conformance checking all that much more difficult.  An example
>of this kind of difficulty is para 2.2 of the S/MIME Message
>Specification, which says that sending and receiving agents SHOULD support
>rsaEncryption, whereas the Cryptographic Message Syntax , para 12.2, says
>that CMS implementations "may" support RSA.  Neither mentions RSA with
>OAEP.
>
>This affects section 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, and most emphatically section 2.7,
>"ContentEncryption AlgorithmIdentifier", and 2.7.1.3 "Rule 3, Unknown
>Capabilities, Unknown Version of S/MIME."
>
>Without getting into international politics, at the present time
>triple-DES is not exportable from the US, at the very least, and may very
>well not be importable into some other countries.  Specifying that S/MIME
>agents MUST implement triple-DES therefore presents a vendor with Hobson's
>choice -- they can either chose not to be compliant with the RFC, or they
>can chose not to export their product.  Unfortunately, that is no choice
>at all -- any sane US vendor will choose not to be compliant with the RFC,
>rather than lose perhaps 50% of their market.  The only purpose such a
>red-flag-in-front-of-the-bull statement serves, therefore, is a political
>one, and one that will merely lower the credibility of the IETF and the
>IESG in the vendor and business community.  At most the requirement should
>be SHOULD.
>
>The second part of 2.7 specifies that receiving agents SHOULD support
>RC2/40 "or a compatible algorithm at a key size of 40 bits..." This
>recommendation suffers from two major problems, in my view. First, it is
>LESS secure than 56-bit DES, which is now acceptable world-wide (with
>perhaps one or two minor exceptions -- not quite clear) for data
>encryption.  And second, it is a proprietary, trade-secret algorithm.  Not
>only is that contrary to the general direction of the IETF in not
>mandating proprietary algorithms, but the fact that it is a trade secret
>(not withstanding the fact that it has been reverse engineered) means that
>there has not been adequate attention paid to its security in the academic
>cryptanalytic community.  RC2 of any size may well be worth considering
>for support, and might deserve RECOMMENDED status, but that should be up
>to the vendor.  If RC2 is required for backwards compatibility with S/MIME
>v2, then a paragraph noting that fact would be appropriate, as was
>provided as the last paragraph under 2.3 ("Note that S/MIME v2 clients are
>only capable of decrypting content encryption keys using the rsaEncryption
>algorithm.").
>
>(I am taking this position with no lack of respect for Ron Rivest, whom I
>consider a very able cryptographer.  But I would take that position if God
>Herself had invented but not published some particular algorithm.)
>
>With respect to 2.7.1.3, there are two problems. First, it mandates
>triple-DES, which very well may not be available at to the recipient, and
>secondly, it recommends as a fall back position the use of the
>trade-secret RC2/40.  Both statements should be removed. The CMS
>specification should then develop a list of algorithms in rough order of
>strength, to be used for such negotiations as required.
>
>Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
>advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
>originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
>times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
>SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
>can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
>would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
>outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, and
>even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It would not be
>reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
>capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.
>
>I will be addressing my concerns with the CMS specification in a
>subsequent message.
>
>Bob
>
>---------------------------
>Robert R. Jueneman
>Novell, Inc.
>
>(See digital signature DISCLAIMER in attached vCard)
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On
>>Behalf Of The IESG
>>Sent: Monday, May 17, 1999 5:26 AM
>>To: IETF-Announce: ;
>>Cc: RFC Editor; Internet Architecture Board; [email-masked]
>>Subject: Protocol Action: Cryptographic Message Syntax to Proposed
>>Standard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>The IESG has approved publication of the following Internet-Drafts as
>>Proposed Standards:
>>
>> o Cryptographic Message Syntax <draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt>
>> o Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method <draft-ietf-smime-x942-07.txt>
>> o S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling <draft-ietf-smime-cert-08.txt>
>> o S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification <draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt>
>> o Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME <draft-ietf-smime-ess-12.txt>
>>
>>These documents are the product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working
>Group.
>>The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech.
>>
>>
>>Technical Summary
>>
>>These documents describe Version 3 of S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose
>>Internet Mail Extensions). S/MIME provides for the secure
>>communication of MIME Objects, providing Authentication, Integrity and
>>Confidentiality protection. It can be used wherever MIME is used, as
>>it is fully conformant with the general MIME specifications. The
>>documents here provide for the basic message syntax and semantics as
>>well as the certificate and key management infrastructure
>>required. This work is coordinated and builds upon the work of the
>>IETF X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Working Group (PKIX).
>>
>>In addition to the basic security services mentioned above, several
>>optional services are described. These include signed receipt
>>handling, security labeling of objects, secure mailing lists and
>>signing certificates.
>>
>>Working Group Summary
>>
>>The working group came to consensus on the work described here. A lot
>>of people contributed thoughtful, useful and constructive comments
>>during the review periods which resulted in further improvements
>>reflected in these documents.
>>
>>Jeffrey I. Schiller reviewed the specification for IESG.
>>
>>
>
>

Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 21:02:19 +0100
From: Dr Stephen Henson <[email-masked]>
Organization: Dr S N Henson
To: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: X9.42 comments.
Sender: [email-masked]

As an initial step to implementing S/MIME v3 I started examining X9.42
at length with a view to implementing DH certificates support (which may
well end up in OpenSSL at some point). Previously I'd only verified the
KEK generation examples and not started on a full implementation.

I assume there are no examples available yet? By examples I mean
examples of key pairs, parameters, SEED values and shared secrets that
is: not just the KEK generation stuff which is already present.

A few things have cropped up: maybe some more will crop up during
(attempted) implementation. My appologies in advance for mentioning them
at this late stage, but there are certain things that only crop up when
you try to implement the algorithm.

All in section 2.2.1.1

Firstly at the start:

>Let L - 1 = n*m + b where both b and n are integers and 0 <= b < 160.

For arbitrary values of L and m this cannot always be satisfied. I'm not
100% sure but I think this should be:

"Let L - 1 = n*160 + b where both b and n are integers and 
0 <= b < 160"

which is the same as FIPS186. The reason being 'n' and 'b' are used to
generate 'W' (and ultimately p) by adding together 160 bit "chunks" in
step 10. The "160" here comes from the size of an SHA digest.

Then step 4:

> 4. for i = 0 to m' - 1
>
> U = U + SHA[SEED + i] XOR SHA[(SEED + m' + i) mod 2^160] *
> 2^(160 * i)
>
> Note that for m=160, this reduces to the algorithm of [FIPS-186]
>
> U = SHA[SEED] XOR SHA[(SEED+1) mod 2^160 ]."

Presumably SHA refers to SHA-1? 

My copy of FIPS-186 has (mod 2^g) in it (g is size of seed in bits) not
(mod 2^160). As things stand (mod 2^160) is effectively throwing away
the first g-160 bits of SEED, whereas (mod 2^g) is discarding any carry
(which is admittedly rather unlikely).

Anyway for completeness should the carry be discarded on the first part
as well? So the complete thing would read:

U = U + SHA[(SEED + i)mod 2^g] XOR SHA[(SEED + m' + i) mod 2^g] * 2^(160
* i)

Otherwise there is a very unlikely posibility that SEED + i will be
longer than SEED (but this case is excluded in the second SHA anyway).

Couple more things. The use of g for two separate things is a little
confusing: size of SEED in bits and one of the DH parameters. Though
FIPS186 does this as well.

Presumably the size of SEED in bits must be a multiple of 8? Since SEED
is represented as a BIT STRING (see PKIX) this need not be so. I assume
the "no trailing zero bits" DER encoding rule doesn't apply here:
otherwise there will be possible ambiguity.

Finally step 10 seems a bit garbled: there are a few ^ missing.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [email-masked] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Business Email: [email-masked] PGP key: via homepage.

Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 11:11:35 -0700
To: [email-masked]
From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Sender: [email-masked]

Can we PLEASE drop this thread? It makes no sense for a couple of reasons:

- The spec already has passed the IESG. Done. If you want to debate this, 
you have to issue a new spec and argue about that. (I'm not suggesting 
this, just saying that is what you have to do.)

- When we chartered this WG, we were told we had to use strong crypto. 
Period. We agreed.

- The arguments that "people won't produce this" have already been proven 
to be false in the marketplace already.

I will say again that I believe that it was inappropriate for this tread to 
be started **after** the specs were approved by the IESG and **years** 
after the discussion had gotten consensus in the WG.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--Internet Mail Consortium

To: [email-masked]
cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Export Restrictions (was Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification)
From: "C. Harald Koch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 11:43:32 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

In message <[email-masked]>, [email-masked] writes:
> Creating a world-wide standard which significant 
> portions of the world are unable to comply with is pointless. 

I can't believe we're having this discussion *again* in the Security Area.
Regardless:

I strongly dispute your claim of "significant portions of the world".
Countries with import or use restrictions on cryptography are rare; even
France has backed down on that one.

Whether you like it or not, American companies and their government's export
restrictions are irrelevant. There are numerous examples of non-US
organisations picking up the slack, and their are numerous examples of
American companies getting around the restrictions. Two examples would be
RSA's new office in Australia, and the Fortify program for Netscape
Communicator.

IETF standards will outlive government restrictions on cryptography, and
should not short-sightedly cater to them. Last time I checked, this was also
the opinion of the IESG.

-- 
C. Harald Koch     <[email-masked]>

"It takes a child to raze a village."
		-Michael T. Fry

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Reply-To: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 20 May 1999 02:54:09 (NZST)
Sender: [email-masked]

Andrew Ferguson <[email-masked]> writes:

>I believe it should say SHOULD (definitly not MUST) and perhaps to be precise
>refer to the newly ratified Wassenaar agreement,  eg : "except where
>prohibited under the Wassenaar Agreement" which will cover export and import
>into and from various countries.

Adding this wouldn't make much sense, Wassenaar isn't a treaty or agreement but
an arrangement, and has no binding force on anyone, so Wassenaar itself doesn't
prohibit anything.  As the Wassenaar articles say, implementation is purely a
matter of national legislation and policy.

Peter.

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 14:27:03 +0100
Subject: RE: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
To: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

I was under the impression that the purpose of defining a standard was to 
create a specification which people could follow, independently, to produce 
interoperable products. Creating a world-wide standard which significant 
portions of the world are unable to comply with is pointless. We are likely to 
end up, unofficially, with S/Mime(Strong) and S/Mime(Weak), people are just as 
likely to be frightened by incompatible varying implementations.

The whole idea of MUST is to produce a minimum level of interoperability which 
EVERYONE can adhere to. SHOULD is there to enable those who have the 
time/money/inclination/authorisation to achieve higher levels of 
interoperability and security, with MAY specifying the very highest levels.

I believe Enzo is correct in his statement that minimum levels of compliance 
cannot be specified as SHOULD. However, the strongest level of encryption 
available, 3DES, ought not to be listed in the minimum compliance requirements.

Bob Jueneman's objection(since withdrawn) to the trade secret RC2 algorithm is 
eminently reasonable. The IETF's refusal to use proprietary or restricted 
material is equally sensible. The problem we have is that the US government 
maintains a "proprietary" claim over 3DES in the form of export restrictions, 
as do many other governments regarding encryption algorithms. Until we have all 
lobbied our respective governments to remove these restrictions we MUST operate 
sensibly within them. 

3DES ought to be listed as SHOULD and those who can write/export 3DES SHOULD 
and those who can't....can't.

I believe that section 2.7.1 provides adequate recommendation and controls to 
enable the strongest available algorithm to be selected. There is a requirement 
for approval to use weak encryption prior to sending each weakly encrypted 
message, so there is little chance of one sending insecure messages by accident.

Bartley O'Malley
UK

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-smime(a)imc.org 
Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 1999 12:26 PM
To: ietf-smime(a)imc.org; aferguso(a)enternet.com.au
Cc: em(a)who.net; cryptography(a)c2.net
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification

I disagree totally with the idea of making strong encryption optional.
First of all, one cannot use SHOULD on matters of minimal compliance.
Second, a standard cannot be defined conditionally to the local laws: at
most, the development process of actual products, and their sales, may have
to depend on them.
Third, allowing exportable (i.e., totally useless) encryption in algorithms
and protocols required for minimal compliance will result in nobody buying
products based on that standard, opting instead for, e.g., OpenPGP, or even
de-facto standards. The right ways to avoid export restriction are:
a) Lobby your governments, letting them know that such stupid laws will
result in job losses and hamper the development of e-commerce, and have the
laws changed. This often works: France is a recent example.
b) If a) fails, develop products in places where those laws do not apply.

Deceiving the public with products which are defined "secure" (what does the
"S" in "S/MIME" stand for?), and are not, is not only unethical, but
ultimately will harm the sales and the vendor's bottom line. IETF should
steer clear from endorsing such ill-advised practices.

Enzo

----- Original Message -----
From: Andrew Ferguson <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 1999 5:47 PM
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification

> Andrew, Robert, All,
> As a watcher, but not up to now an active participant in this debate on
the
> matter of  Issues with the S/MIME Message specification, I believe it
> should say SHOULD (definitly not MUST) and perhaps to be precise refer to
> the newly ratified Wassenaar agreement,  eg : "except where prohibited
> under the Wassenaar Agreement" which will cover export and import into and
> from various countries. This will in effect provide a neat get out clause
> covering both issues. The reality as Bob points out below we Aussies are
> not necessarily worried about the US Export laws, but of course Australia
> now exports our own crypto developed products so we would also affected by
> the statement MUST.
>
>
> Anyway thats my contribution.
>
> At 10:34 19/05/99 , Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
> >>>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
> >>>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
> >>>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
> >>>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.
> >>
> >>I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
> >>more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
> >>application should include an originator key, but there are also counter
> >>examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
> >>since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.
> >>
> >>>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in
=
> >>>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.
> >>
> >>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3
> >
> >Thanks. I knew I had read it, but couldn't find it.
> >
> >Now that I see the exact text once again, and given the apparent
> >request by some to NOT keep a copy, I can live with SHOULD.
> >
> >>
> >>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
> >>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
> >>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
> >>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
> >>debate.
> >>
> >I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still
not
> >thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for me to
> >comply with
> >if I hope to export the product.  I can fully understand that perhaps you
> >might not share my concern on this point--neither do the Canadians, the
> >Australians, or others!  :-)
> >
> >But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if,
for
> >example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you might
> >face losing half of your market as a result?
> >
> >I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there
> >perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
> >"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?
> >
> >Not being compliant with the RFC doesn't bother me all that much--
> >there aren't any IETF police, and procurements that require
> >compatibility just won't get it, except for US/Canada domestic and
> >certain industry sectors outside the US.
> >
> >What concerns me more is the assumption that because the
> >standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
> >actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about
> >what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
> >T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and
> >play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't
> >going to happen.
> >
> >Regards,
> >
> >Bob
> >
> >
>
>
> ------
> Software Agencies Australia Pty Ltd
> 1 Huntingdale Road
> Burwood,
> Victoria 3125
> Australia
> ACN 078 025 813
> Tel: +61-3-9808-0522
> Fax: +61-3-9888-6019
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> Email: [email-masked]
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> Your Business Partner in Electronic and Internet Commerce
>
>

 << File: UnXhrds.txt >> 

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 12:34:42 +0100
From: Andrew Farrell <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Robert Jueneman writes:

>>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
>>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
>>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
>>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
>>debate.

>I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still 
>not thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for
>me to comply with if I hope to export the product.  I can fully
>understand that perhaps you might not share my concern on this
>point--neither do the Canadians, the Australians, or others!  :-)

>But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if, 
>for example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you
>might face losing half of your market as a result?

I'm not here as a representative of my company, but I suspect we'd take
half a market rather than none, and we'd be lobbying our government
continuously to do something against this blatant crippling of Irish
software.

As for an actual employee of an actual US company, Ned Freed put it
better than I could:

http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/mail-archive/msg00169.html

>I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there
>perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
>"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?

MUST is from RFC 2119, and there's no wriggle-room there ("This word, or
the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the definition is an absolute
requirement of the specification"). There can't be, in fairness. It's an
interoperability thing.

All S/MIME has to do is produce something that's secure and
interoperable. If there's an option that's secure and interoperable and
can be exported by anyone from the US, it hasn't been presented, as
far as I know.

>What concerns me more is the assumption that because the
>standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
>actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about
>what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
>T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and
>play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't
>going to happen.

>From listening too much to our marketing people, I get the impression
that US vendors that can't export strong cryptography are doing just
that in those markets. But I'd rather hear something from one of the US
companies. Jim? Blake? Someone from Netscape (who is someone from
Netscape these days)?

Also, it cuts both ways. If the specs have a MUST for weak crypto (and
they have to have a MUST, for interoperability), then people out here
will get requirements that they produce S/MIME that cannot default to
weak crypto, and they'll break interoperability. Not that any of this is
the business of the IETF. The IETF's business is making the best standards.

>Regards,

>Bob

Andrew.

From: "Enzo Michelangeli" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>, "Andrew Ferguson" <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 19:24:50 +0800
Sender: [email-masked]

I disagree totally with the idea of making strong encryption optional.
First of all, one cannot use SHOULD on matters of minimal compliance.
Second, a standard cannot be defined conditionally to the local laws: at
most, the development process of actual products, and their sales, may have
to depend on them.
Third, allowing exportable (i.e., totally useless) encryption in algorithms
and protocols required for minimal compliance will result in nobody buying
products based on that standard, opting instead for, e.g., OpenPGP, or even
de-facto standards. The right ways to avoid export restriction are:
a) Lobby your governments, letting them know that such stupid laws will
result in job losses and hamper the development of e-commerce, and have the
laws changed. This often works: France is a recent example.
b) If a) fails, develop products in places where those laws do not apply.

Deceiving the public with products which are defined "secure" (what does the
"S" in "S/MIME" stand for?), and are not, is not only unethical, but
ultimately will harm the sales and the vendor's bottom line. IETF should
steer clear from endorsing such ill-advised practices.

Enzo

----- Original Message -----
From: Andrew Ferguson <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 1999 5:47 PM
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification

> Andrew, Robert, All,
> As a watcher, but not up to now an active participant in this debate on
the
> matter of  Issues with the S/MIME Message specification, I believe it
> should say SHOULD (definitly not MUST) and perhaps to be precise refer to
> the newly ratified Wassenaar agreement,  eg : "except where prohibited
> under the Wassenaar Agreement" which will cover export and import into and
> from various countries. This will in effect provide a neat get out clause
> covering both issues. The reality as Bob points out below we Aussies are
> not necessarily worried about the US Export laws, but of course Australia
> now exports our own crypto developed products so we would also affected by
> the statement MUST.
>
>
> Anyway thats my contribution.
>
> At 10:34 19/05/99 , Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
> >>>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
> >>>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
> >>>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
> >>>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.
> >>
> >>I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
> >>more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
> >>application should include an originator key, but there are also counter
> >>examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
> >>since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.
> >>
> >>>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in
=
> >>>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.
> >>
> >>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3
> >
> >Thanks. I knew I had read it, but couldn't find it.
> >
> >Now that I see the exact text once again, and given the apparent
> >request by some to NOT keep a copy, I can live with SHOULD.
> >
> >>
> >>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
> >>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
> >>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
> >>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
> >>debate.
> >>
> >I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still
not
> >thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for me to
> >comply with
> >if I hope to export the product.  I can fully understand that perhaps you
> >might not share my concern on this point--neither do the Canadians, the
> >Australians, or others!  :-)
> >
> >But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if,
for
> >example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you might
> >face losing half of your market as a result?
> >
> >I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there
> >perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
> >"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?
> >
> >Not being compliant with the RFC doesn't bother me all that much--
> >there aren't any IETF police, and procurements that require
> >compatibility just won't get it, except for US/Canada domestic and
> >certain industry sectors outside the US.
> >
> >What concerns me more is the assumption that because the
> >standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
> >actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about
> >what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
> >T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and
> >play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't
> >going to happen.
> >
> >Regards,
> >
> >Bob
> >
> >
>
>
> ------
> Software Agencies Australia Pty Ltd
> 1 Huntingdale Road
> Burwood,
> Victoria 3125
> Australia
> ACN 078 025 813
> Tel: +61-3-9808-0522
> Fax: +61-3-9888-6019
> Mobile: +61-41-222-3940
> Email: [email-masked]
> URL: www.software-aus.com.au
> Your Business Partner in Electronic and Internet Commerce
>
>

Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 19:47:21 +1000
To: "[email-masked]"<[email-masked]>
From: Andrew Ferguson <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Sender: [email-masked]

Andrew, Robert, All,
As a watcher, but not up to now an active participant in this debate on the
matter of  Issues with the S/MIME Message specification, I believe it
should say SHOULD (definitly not MUST) and perhaps to be precise refer to
the newly ratified Wassenaar agreement,  eg : "except where prohibited
under the Wassenaar Agreement" which will cover export and import into and
from various countries. This will in effect provide a neat get out clause
covering both issues. The reality as Bob points out below we Aussies are
not necessarily worried about the US Export laws, but of course Australia
now exports our own crypto developed products so we would also affected by
the statement MUST.

Anyway thats my contribution.

At 10:34 19/05/99 , Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
>>>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
>>>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
>>>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
>>>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.
>>
>>I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
>>more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
>>application should include an originator key, but there are also counter
>>examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
>>since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.
>>
>>>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in =
>>>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.
>>
>>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3
>
>Thanks. I knew I had read it, but couldn't find it.
>
>Now that I see the exact text once again, and given the apparent 
>request by some to NOT keep a copy, I can live with SHOULD.
>
>>
>>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
>>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
>>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
>>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
>>debate.
>>
>I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still not 
>thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for me to 
>comply with 
>if I hope to export the product.  I can fully understand that perhaps you 
>might not share my concern on this point--neither do the Canadians, the
>Australians, or others!  :-)
>
>But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if, for 
>example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you might 
>face losing half of your market as a result?
>
>I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there 
>perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
>"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?
>
>Not being compliant with the RFC doesn't bother me all that much--
>there aren't any IETF police, and procurements that require 
>compatibility just won't get it, except for US/Canada domestic and 
>certain industry sectors outside the US.  
>
>What concerns me more is the assumption that because the 
>standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
>actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about 
>what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
>T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and 
>play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't 
>going to happen.
>
>Regards,
>
>Bob
>
>

------
Software Agencies Australia Pty Ltd
1 Huntingdale Road
Burwood,
Victoria 3125
Australia
ACN 078 025 813 
Tel: +61-3-9808-0522
Fax: +61-3-9888-6019
Mobile: +61-41-222-3940
Email: [email-masked]
URL: www.software-aus.com.au
Your Business Partner in Electronic and Internet Commerce

Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 19:45:17 +1000
To: <[email-masked]>, "Andrew Farrell" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
From: Andrew Ferguson <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Cc: "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Andrew, Robert, All,
As a watcher, but not up to now an active participant in this debate on the
matter of  Issues with the S/MIME Message specification, I believe it
should say SHOULD (definitly not MUST) and perhaps to be precise refer to
the newly ratified Wassenaar agreement,  eg : "except where prohibited
under the Wassenaar Agreement" which will cover export and import into and
from various countries. This will in effect provide a neat get out clause
covering both issues. The reality as Bob points out below we Aussies are
not necessarily worried about the US Export laws, but of course Australia
now exports our own crypto developed products so we would also affected by
the statement MUST.

Anyway thats my contribution.

At 10:34 19/05/99 , Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
>>>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
>>>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
>>>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
>>>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.
>>
>>I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
>>more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
>>application should include an originator key, but there are also counter
>>examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
>>since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.
>>
>>>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in =
>>>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.
>>
>>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3
>
>Thanks. I knew I had read it, but couldn't find it.
>
>Now that I see the exact text once again, and given the apparent 
>request by some to NOT keep a copy, I can live with SHOULD.
>
>>
>>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
>>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
>>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
>>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
>>debate.
>>
>I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still not 
>thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for me to 
>comply with 
>if I hope to export the product.  I can fully understand that perhaps you 
>might not share my concern on this point--neither do the Canadians, the
>Australians, or others!  :-)
>
>But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if, for 
>example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you might 
>face losing half of your market as a result?
>
>I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there 
>perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
>"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?
>
>Not being compliant with the RFC doesn't bother me all that much--
>there aren't any IETF police, and procurements that require 
>compatibility just won't get it, except for US/Canada domestic and 
>certain industry sectors outside the US.  
>
>What concerns me more is the assumption that because the 
>standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
>actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about 
>what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
>T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and 
>play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't 
>going to happen.
>
>Regards,
>
>Bob
>
>

------
Software Agencies Australia Pty Ltd
1 Huntingdale Road
Burwood,
Victoria 3125
Australia
ACN 078 025 813 
Tel: +61-3-9808-0522
Fax: +61-3-9888-6019
Mobile: +61-41-222-3940
Email: [email-masked]
URL: www.software-aus.com.au
Your Business Partner in Electronic and Internet Commerce

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
To: "Andrew Farrell" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 18:34:01 -0600
Importance: Normal
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_00D3_01BEA15C.FFFDF850
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

>>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
>>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
>>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
>>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.
>
>I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
>more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
>application should include an originator key, but there are also =
counter
>examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
>since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.
>
>>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in =
=3D
>>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.
>
>draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3

Thanks. I knew I had read it, but couldn't find it.

Now that I see the exact text once again, and given the apparent=20
request by some to NOT keep a copy, I can live with SHOULD.

>
>Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
>was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
>There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
>mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
>debate.
>
I can certainly understand preferring triple-DES vs. RC4, but I'm still =
not=20
thrilled about having a firm specification that it is illegal for me to =
comply with=20
if I hope to export the product.  I can fully understand that perhaps =
you=20
might not share my concern on this point--neither do the Canadians, the
Australians, or others!  :-)

But what would your position be if the situation were reversed, or if, =
for=20
example, you could not export such a product to the US, and you might=20
face losing half of your market as a result?

I confess I haven't looked up the precise definition of MUST. Is there=20
perhaps some face saving wriggle-room that says something like
"except where prohibited by law or regulations"?

Not being compliant with the RFC doesn't bother me all that much--
there aren't any IETF police, and procurements that require=20
compatibility just won't get it, except for US/Canada domestic and=20
certain industry sectors outside the US. =20

What concerns me more is the assumption that because the=20
standard says MUST, there is a presumption that it WILL
actually be so, and that interoperability decisions about=20
what kind of algorithms can be used can assume this as a default.
T'ain't so, unfortunately, unless all of the US vendors roll over and=20
play dead in the European and Asian markets. And that isn't=20
going to happen.

Regards,

Bob

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EMAIL;PREF;INTERNET:[email-masked]
REV:19990514T154441Z
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------=_NextPart_000_00D3_01BEA15C.FFFDF850--

To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 01:05:47 +0100
From: Andrew Farrell <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Robert Jeuneman writes:

>Eric,

>Thanks for your comments.  I hadn't considered the possible difference 
>in scope between the S/MIME Message Specification and the CMS, but I can 
>see that CMS might have broader applicability, and hence, differing 
>requirements.

This is also the reason why there are, on close examination, no MUSTs
or SHOULDs in CMS. 

>With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted
>message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't
>have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more
>inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.

I'm not sure that the My Esteemed Colleague's comment was anything
more than a point of information. There will be situations when an
application should include an originator key, but there are also counter
examples. Locking a MUST into the standard is unnecessary, particularly
since there's no compelling interoperability or security issue.

>I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in =
>one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.

draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, section 3.3

Also, it should be noted that switching from MUST RC4 to MUST tripleDES
was the very first thing the ietf-smime group did, back 2 years ago.
There was a lot of discussion back then, all of it available on the IMC
mail archive. Not intended as a brush-off: there was a lot of relevant
debate.

>Regards,

>Bob

Andrew.

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 16:26:42 -0600
Importance: Normal
Sender: [email-masked]

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_00BB_01BEA14B.36950EB0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Eric,

Thanks for your comments.  I hadn't considered the possible difference =
in scope between the S/MIME Message Specification and the CMS, but I can =
see that CMS might have broader applicability, and hence, differing =
requirements.

I was also unaware of the fact that an information RFC had been =
published on RC2, and withdraw my comments on that accordingly.

With respect to the issue of bcc'ing the originator on an encrypted =
message, although I suppose it is possible that the originator doesn't =
have a public encryption key, this seems mildly unlikely, so I am more =
inclined to agree with William Whyte's comment.

I wish I could find where I read that statement -- I thought it was in =
one of the RFC's, but I can't find it.

Regards,

Bob

---------------------------
Robert R. Jueneman
Novell, Inc.

>-----Original Message-----
>From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
>Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 1999 2:03 PM
>To: [email-masked]
>Cc: The IESG; RFC Editor; [email-masked]
>Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
>
>
>"Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]> writes:
>> Regarding the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification,
>> draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, I believe that all MUSTs and SHOULDs
>> regarding specific cryptographic algorithms should be removed from =
this
>> document, and contained only in the Cryptographic Message Syntax=20
>document.
>> I can see no reason at all why such things should be specified=20
>twice -- it
>> just makes conformance checking all that much more difficult.  An =
example
>> of this kind of difficulty is para 2.2 of the S/MIME Message
>> Specification, which says that sending and receiving agents=20
>SHOULD support
>> rsaEncryption, whereas the Cryptographic Message Syntax , para 12.2, =
says
>> that CMS implementations "may" support RSA.  Neither mentions RSA =
with
>> OAEP.
>CMS and S/MIME MSG intentionally have different requirements.
>In order to preserve backwards compatibility with S/MIMEv2,
>implementations SHOULD implement RSA. CMS implementations that
>do not need to be used in the S/MIME context may very well
>have no need to use RSA.
>
>> The second part of 2.7 specifies that receiving agents SHOULD support
>> RC2/40 "or a compatible algorithm at a key size of 40 bits..." This
>> recommendation suffers from two major problems, in my view. First, it =
is
>> LESS secure than 56-bit DES, which is now acceptable world-wide (with
>> perhaps one or two minor exceptions -- not quite clear) for data
>> encryption.
>The purpose of this is once again for compatability with S/MIME v2=20
>which required RC2.=20
>
>>  And second, it is a proprietary, trade-secret algorithm.=20
>This statement is incorrect. See RFC-2268:
>
>2268 A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm. R. Rivest.
>     January 1998. (Format: TXT=3D19048 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
>
>> Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding =
the
>> advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
>> originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
>> times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that =
this
>> SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, =
for I
>> can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted =
message
>> would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
>> outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, =
and
>> even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It=20
>would not be
>> reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
>> capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.
>I disagree. Firstly, it's entirely possible that the originator
>does not have a public key suitable for data encryption -- he
>might have a signature only key. Secondly, encrypted content keys
>take up a not-insignificant amount of space in the message. Mandating
>this serves no interoperability requirement and therefore=20
>it's inappropriate.
>
>-Ekr
>
>--=20
>[Eric Rescorla                                   [email-masked]]
>

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ORG:Novell, Inc.;Network Security Group
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certificates are=3D0D=3D0Aattached, the intended purpose is to =
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EMAIL;PREF;INTERNET:[email-masked]
REV:19990514T154441Z
END:VCARD

------=_NextPart_000_00BB_01BEA14B.36950EB0--

Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 16:03:21 -0600
From: "Bob Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim,

I still can't find the comment, so maybe I'm remembering something from an 
e-mail exchange or something -- is the statement included somewhere, or 
not?

I can't tell from your message which functionality was requested --
that the self-encrypted message be included, or not. Or were you
referring to a request to Microsoft, rather than to the IETF?

In any case, although I value the human rights worker's cause,
and also the whistle blower's, etc., there is another set of values
that also needs to be addressed at the same time, and that is the
need for either the business or the user to be able to recover
encrypted messages, of various but legitimate purposes.

One set of values doesn't necessarily trump the other -- they need
to be debated on their merits.

(Again, apologies if this issue was thrashed to death without my having 
seen it go by.)

Bob

>>> "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]> 05/18/99 03:41PM >>>

Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, and
even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It would not be
reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.

[Jim Schaad]  This was a requested functionality by a group of people and is
there for a reason.  One situation in which this would be the case is human
rights workers sending encrypted mail to the home office.  They do not want
the local police to be able to read the mail by stealing the machine and key
or by force.

jim schaad

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 14:41:58 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, and
even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It would not be
reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.

[Jim Schaad]  This was a requested functionality by a group of people and is
there for a reason.  One situation in which this would be the case is human
rights workers sending encrypted mail to the home office.  They do not want
the local police to be able to read the mail by stealing the machine and key
or by force.

jim schaad

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Reply-To: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 08:55:10 (NZST)
Sender: [email-masked]

[SHOULD -> MUST for encrypt-to-self]

It's probably unnecessary to mention that there should have been a smiley 
after the X.400 comment in my previous message... another reason why
saying anything on the use of encrypt-to-self is a bad thing is that it 
assumes that S/MIME mail will only ever be sent by humans.  There are all
sorts of protocols and messaging systems being built around S/MIME, for
many of these encrypt-to-self is completely illogical or even dangerous
(consider its use in medical EDI (HL7) messaging systems where the message 
indicates that the sender has been diagnosed with some terminal illness, 
that's something you definitely don't want the sender to stumble across 
unless they've been prepared for it).  This is really a matter for users
to decide, and not something which the standard should comment on.

Peter.

Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 13:13:38 -0700
To: <[email-masked]>
From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification 
Cc: "RFC Editor" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

At 12:34 PM 5/18/99 -0600, Robert R. Jueneman wrote:
>I sincerely regret not having had sufficient time to review the S/MIME v3
>specs in detail during last call and prior to their moving to Proposed
>Standard, but I believe that there are several changes that absolutely
>must be made before they can progress to final Standard.

The issues you bring up here were not changed in the last call drafts. The 
location of the requirements for algorithms has been the same for over a 
year. I believe that it is inappropriate for you to object to the RFC 
Editor at this very late date.

The step after they become Proposed Standards is to possibly become Draft 
Standards, not "final Standard". There will be plenty of time to discuss 
your issues in the Working Group in the interim.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--Internet Mail Consortium

To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: "The IESG" <[email-masked]>, "RFC Editor" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
From: EKR <[email-masked]>
Date: 18 May 1999 13:02:52 -0700
Lines: 55
Sender: [email-masked]

"Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]> writes:
> Regarding the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification,
> draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, I believe that all MUSTs and SHOULDs
> regarding specific cryptographic algorithms should be removed from this
> document, and contained only in the Cryptographic Message Syntax document.
> I can see no reason at all why such things should be specified twice -- it
> just makes conformance checking all that much more difficult.  An example
> of this kind of difficulty is para 2.2 of the S/MIME Message
> Specification, which says that sending and receiving agents SHOULD support
> rsaEncryption, whereas the Cryptographic Message Syntax , para 12.2, says
> that CMS implementations "may" support RSA.  Neither mentions RSA with
> OAEP.
CMS and S/MIME MSG intentionally have different requirements.
In order to preserve backwards compatibility with S/MIMEv2,
implementations SHOULD implement RSA. CMS implementations that
do not need to be used in the S/MIME context may very well
have no need to use RSA.

> The second part of 2.7 specifies that receiving agents SHOULD support
> RC2/40 "or a compatible algorithm at a key size of 40 bits..." This
> recommendation suffers from two major problems, in my view. First, it is
> LESS secure than 56-bit DES, which is now acceptable world-wide (with
> perhaps one or two minor exceptions -- not quite clear) for data
> encryption.
The purpose of this is once again for compatability with S/MIME v2 
which required RC2. 

>  And second, it is a proprietary, trade-secret algorithm. 
This statement is incorrect. See RFC-2268:

2268 A Description of the RC2(r) Encryption Algorithm. R. Rivest.
     January 1998. (Format: TXT=19048 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)

> Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
> advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
> originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
> times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
> SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
> can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
> would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
> outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, and
> even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It would not be
> reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
> capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.
I disagree. Firstly, it's entirely possible that the originator
does not have a public key suitable for data encryption -- he
might have a signature only key. Secondly, encrypted content keys
take up a not-insignificant amount of space in the message. Mandating
this serves no interoperability requirement and therefore 
it's inappropriate.

-Ekr

-- 
[Eric Rescorla                                   [email-masked]]

From: William Whyte <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 20:33:57 +0100
Organization: Baltimore Technologies
Sender: [email-masked]

> >Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
> >advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
> >originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
> >times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
> >SHOULD be done....
> 
> Given that anyone who wants to re-read their own messages will keep a copy 
> stored locally, why on earth would they go through the complex encrypt->
> decrypt process just to read what they've written?  I think even the presence
> of SHOULD is too restrictire for this, 
> ...
> Anyone who 
> needs sent-mail revocation and whatnot desperately enough can go use X.400 
> for their mail.

Not quite right. If you're using (for example) Outlook, the message
that's stored in your Sent Mail box is the message that was actually
sent. You need to have encrypted it to yourself to be able to read
it subsequently.

William

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
To: [email-masked], [email-masked], [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Reply-To: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 07:08:52 (NZST)
Sender: [email-masked]

[Recipient list trimmed somewhat]

"Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]> writes:

>Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
>advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
>originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
>times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
>SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
>can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
>would not want to be able to read his own message, 

Given that anyone who wants to re-read their own messages will keep a copy 
stored locally, why on earth would they go through the complex encrypt->
decrypt process just to read what they've written?  I think even the presence
of SHOULD is too restrictire for this, it's purely a matter for the sender to
decide and doesn't really have any place in MSG - for the majority of users
all it'll do is double the number of keys available for attack.  Anyone who 
needs sent-mail revocation and whatnot desperately enough can go use X.400 
for their mail.

Peter.

Reply-To: <[email-masked]>
From: "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
To: "The IESG" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "RFC Editor" <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>, "Robert R. Jueneman" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Issues with S/MIME Message Specification
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999 12:34:32 -0600
Importance: Normal
Sender: [email-masked]

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

I sincerely regret not having had sufficient time to review the S/MIME v3
specs in detail during last call and prior to their moving to Proposed
Standard, but I believe that there are several changes that absolutely
must be made before they can progress to final Standard.

Regarding the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification,
draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt, I believe that all MUSTs and SHOULDs
regarding specific cryptographic algorithms should be removed from this
document, and contained only in the Cryptographic Message Syntax document.
I can see no reason at all why such things should be specified twice -- it
just makes conformance checking all that much more difficult.  An example
of this kind of difficulty is para 2.2 of the S/MIME Message
Specification, which says that sending and receiving agents SHOULD support
rsaEncryption, whereas the Cryptographic Message Syntax , para 12.2, says
that CMS implementations "may" support RSA.  Neither mentions RSA with
OAEP.

This affects section 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, and most emphatically section 2.7,
"ContentEncryption AlgorithmIdentifier", and 2.7.1.3 "Rule 3, Unknown
Capabilities, Unknown Version of S/MIME."

Without getting into international politics, at the present time
triple-DES is not exportable from the US, at the very least, and may very
well not be importable into some other countries.  Specifying that S/MIME
agents MUST implement triple-DES therefore presents a vendor with Hobson's
choice -- they can either chose not to be compliant with the RFC, or they
can chose not to export their product.  Unfortunately, that is no choice
at all -- any sane US vendor will choose not to be compliant with the RFC,
rather than lose perhaps 50% of their market.  The only purpose such a
red-flag-in-front-of-the-bull statement serves, therefore, is a political
one, and one that will merely lower the credibility of the IETF and the
IESG in the vendor and business community.  At most the requirement should
be SHOULD.

The second part of 2.7 specifies that receiving agents SHOULD support
RC2/40 "or a compatible algorithm at a key size of 40 bits..." This
recommendation suffers from two major problems, in my view. First, it is
LESS secure than 56-bit DES, which is now acceptable world-wide (with
perhaps one or two minor exceptions -- not quite clear) for data
encryption.  And second, it is a proprietary, trade-secret algorithm.  Not
only is that contrary to the general direction of the IETF in not
mandating proprietary algorithms, but the fact that it is a trade secret
(not withstanding the fact that it has been reverse engineered) means that
there has not been adequate attention paid to its security in the academic
cryptanalytic community.  RC2 of any size may well be worth considering
for support, and might deserve RECOMMENDED status, but that should be up
to the vendor.  If RC2 is required for backwards compatibility with S/MIME
v2, then a paragraph noting that fact would be appropriate, as was
provided as the last paragraph under 2.3 ("Note that S/MIME v2 clients are
only capable of decrypting content encryption keys using the rsaEncryption
algorithm.").

(I am taking this position with no lack of respect for Ron Rivest, whom I
consider a very able cryptographer.  But I would take that position if God
Herself had invented but not published some particular algorithm.)

With respect to 2.7.1.3, there are two problems. First, it mandates
triple-DES, which very well may not be available at to the recipient, and
secondly, it recommends as a fall back position the use of the
trade-secret RC2/40.  Both statements should be removed. The CMS
specification should then develop a list of algorithms in rough order of
strength, to be used for such negotiations as required.

Finally, somewhere in these documents there is a statement regarding the
advisability of including the content encryption key encrypted in the
originator's public key, but despite rereading the documents multiple
times I can't find that text again.  As I recall, the text said that this
SHOULD be done.  I would argue that this should be changed to MUST, for I
can't imagine a situation where the originator of an encrypted message
would not want to be able to read his own message, for example in an
outgoing or Sent-Mail queue. He might need to be able to decrypted, and
even retract it in order to resend it with modifications.  It would not be
reasonable to rely on the originator to bcc herself to gain this
capability -- it ought to be required by the spec.

I will be addressing my concerns with the CMS specification in a
subsequent message.

Bob

---------------------------
Robert R. Jueneman
Novell, Inc.

(See digital signature DISCLAIMER in attached vCard)

>-----Original Message-----
>From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On
>Behalf Of The IESG
>Sent: Monday, May 17, 1999 5:26 AM
>To: IETF-Announce: ;
>Cc: RFC Editor; Internet Architecture Board; [email-masked]
>Subject: Protocol Action: Cryptographic Message Syntax to Proposed
>Standard
>
>
>
>
>The IESG has approved publication of the following Internet-Drafts as
>Proposed Standards:
>
> o Cryptographic Message Syntax <draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt>
> o Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method <draft-ietf-smime-x942-07.txt>
> o S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling <draft-ietf-smime-cert-08.txt>
> o S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification <draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt>
> o Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME <draft-ietf-smime-ess-12.txt>
>
>These documents are the product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working
Group.
>The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech.
>
>
>Technical Summary
>
>These documents describe Version 3 of S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose
>Internet Mail Extensions). S/MIME provides for the secure
>communication of MIME Objects, providing Authentication, Integrity and
>Confidentiality protection. It can be used wherever MIME is used, as
>it is fully conformant with the general MIME specifications. The
>documents here provide for the basic message syntax and semantics as
>well as the certificate and key management infrastructure
>required. This work is coordinated and builds upon the work of the
>IETF X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Working Group (PKIX).
>
>In addition to the basic security services mentioned above, several
>optional services are described. These include signed receipt
>handling, security labeling of objects, secure mailing lists and
>signing certificates.
>
>Working Group Summary
>
>The working group came to consensus on the work described here. A lot
>of people contributed thoughtful, useful and constructive comments
>during the review periods which resulted in further improvements
>reflected in these documents.
>
>Jeffrey I. Schiller reviewed the specification for IESG.
>
>

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    WarNq/mikm+L

EMAIL;PREF;INTERNET:[email-masked]
REV:19990514T154441Z
END:VCARD

------=_NextPart_000_004F_01BEA118.F156D7C0--

------=_NextPart_000_0052_01BEA118.F1833EF0
Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature;
	name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
	filename="smime.p7s"

------=_NextPart_000_0052_01BEA118.F1833EF0--

Date: Mon, 17 May 1999 12:12:20 -0700
To: [email-masked], [email-masked]
From: Jason Eaton <[email-masked]>
Subject: SCMP Mail Discussion List
Cc: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

Simple Commerce Messaging Protocol ( SCMP ) 

SCMP is a general purpose commerce messaging protocol based on S/MIME.

There is a new mail list for discussion of the SCMP draft (
draft-arnold-scmp-02.txt ). Paul Hoffman at IMC has generously agreed to
host the list. To subscribe, send a message to "[email-masked]"
with the word "subscribe" in the body of the message.

Thanks.

Jason Eaton			CyberSource Corporation
Phone 408.260.6044		Security Engineering Manager
[email-masked]	http://www.cybersource.com

To: IETF-Announce: ;
Cc: RFC Editor <[email-masked]>
Cc: Internet Architecture Board <[email-masked]>
Cc: [email-masked]
From: The IESG <[email-masked]>
Subject: Protocol Action: Cryptographic Message Syntax to Proposed Standard
Date: Mon, 17 May 1999 07:26:04 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

The IESG has approved publication of the following Internet-Drafts as
Proposed Standards:

 o Cryptographic Message Syntax <draft-ietf-smime-cms-13.txt> 
 o Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method <draft-ietf-smime-x942-07.txt> 
 o S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling <draft-ietf-smime-cert-08.txt>
 o S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification <draft-ietf-smime-msg-08.txt>
 o Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME <draft-ietf-smime-ess-12.txt>

These documents are the product of the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group.
The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech.

Technical Summary
 
These documents describe Version 3 of S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions). S/MIME provides for the secure
communication of MIME Objects, providing Authentication, Integrity and
Confidentiality protection. It can be used wherever MIME is used, as
it is fully conformant with the general MIME specifications. The
documents here provide for the basic message syntax and semantics as
well as the certificate and key management infrastructure
required. This work is coordinated and builds upon the work of the
IETF X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Working Group (PKIX).

In addition to the basic security services mentioned above, several
optional services are described. These include signed receipt
handling, security labeling of objects, secure mailing lists and
signing certificates.

Working Group Summary

The working group came to consensus on the work described here. A lot
of people contributed thoughtful, useful and constructive comments
during the review periods which resulted in further improvements
reflected in these documents.

Jeffrey I. Schiller reviewed the specification for IESG.

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: Receipt Request Attribute
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 10:24:09 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

All,

I had forgotten about the text in section 1.3.4 -- I agree that would
disallow the placment in a receipt request in a counter signature.

I also agree that I don't have a reason for doing receipt requests in
counter signatures, but I have also learned never to underestimate the
things needed by somebody in the market that I have never heard of and will
hopefully never hear from.   Given that the question was being asked I made
the assumption that Tom had some type of requirement that might require this
type of behavior.

jim

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 1999 8:56 AM
To: Jim Schaad (Exchange); [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Receipt Request Attribute

All,

I respectfully disagree with Jim's reply to Tom's message.

First, ESS Section 1.3.4, Placement of Attributes, states: "The only
attributes that are allowed in a counterSignature attribute are 
counterSignature, messageDigest, signingTime, and
signingCertificates."  This means that receiptRequest attributes are
not allowed to be carried in a counterSignature attribute.

Second, IMHO, it does not make sense to request a signedReceipt for
a counterSignature.  A signedReceipt is intended to prove that a
recipient received and was able to verify the signature of the
message sent by the signer.  What would a signedReceipt prove 
for a counterSignature since the thing that is signed is not
a message, it is the originator's signature of the original message???

I do not believe that we should change ESS to allow receiptRequests 
to be included in counterSignature attributes.

- John Pawling

> 
> Tom,
> 
> My opinion on this would be:
> 
> 1.  A CounterSignature can contain a receipt request.
> 2.  The receipt request on the original SignedData and the receipt receipt
> on the CounterSignature can be different.  The requirement is that all
> receipt requests in a SignerInfo sequence be the same and a CounterSigner
> has a different SignerInfo sequence
> 
> jim
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tom Kung [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Monday, May 10, 1999 11:48 AM
> To: [email-masked]'
> Subject: Receipt Request Attribute
> 
> 
> Gooday,
> 
> I would appreciate clarification on the following with respect to the
> Receipt Request attribute:
> 
> 1.	May a CounterSignature contain a receipt request?
> 
> 2.	If so, MUST all receipt requests in a SignedData be identical?  The
> spec specifies that all Receipt Requests be identical.  Is it the intent
> that CounterSignatures containing a receipt request MUST also be identical
> with other receipt requests if it exists?  I don't see why each
> countersignature can not have a different receipt request.
> 
> 
> thanx,tom.
> 

From: [email-masked] (John Pawling)
Subject: Re: Receipt Request Attribute
To: [email-masked] (Jim Schaad), [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 11:56:29 -0400 (EDT)
Cc: [email-masked]
Sender: [email-masked]

All,

I respectfully disagree with Jim's reply to Tom's message.

First, ESS Section 1.3.4, Placement of Attributes, states: "The only
attributes that are allowed in a counterSignature attribute are 
counterSignature, messageDigest, signingTime, and
signingCertificates."  This means that receiptRequest attributes are
not allowed to be carried in a counterSignature attribute.

Second, IMHO, it does not make sense to request a signedReceipt for
a counterSignature.  A signedReceipt is intended to prove that a
recipient received and was able to verify the signature of the
message sent by the signer.  What would a signedReceipt prove 
for a counterSignature since the thing that is signed is not
a message, it is the originator's signature of the original message???

I do not believe that we should change ESS to allow receiptRequests 
to be included in counterSignature attributes.

- John Pawling

> 
> Tom,
> 
> My opinion on this would be:
> 
> 1.  A CounterSignature can contain a receipt request.
> 2.  The receipt request on the original SignedData and the receipt receipt
> on the CounterSignature can be different.  The requirement is that all
> receipt requests in a SignerInfo sequence be the same and a CounterSigner
> has a different SignerInfo sequence
> 
> jim
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tom Kung [mailto:[email-masked]]
> Sent: Monday, May 10, 1999 11:48 AM
> To: [email-masked]'
> Subject: Receipt Request Attribute
> 
> 
> Gooday,
> 
> I would appreciate clarification on the following with respect to the
> Receipt Request attribute:
> 
> 1.	May a CounterSignature contain a receipt request?
> 
> 2.	If so, MUST all receipt requests in a SignedData be identical?  The
> spec specifies that all Receipt Requests be identical.  Is it the intent
> that CounterSignatures containing a receipt request MUST also be identical
> with other receipt requests if it exists?  I don't see why each
> countersignature can not have a different receipt request.
> 
> 
> thanx,tom.
> 

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "Russ Housley (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>, "Paul Hoffman (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Subject: New SMime Capabilities item
Date: Tue, 11 May 1999 19:59:31 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

Please add the following to the SMimeCapabilities section of the OIDs
document on IMC.ORG.

sMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= {sMIMECapabilities 3}
SMIMECapabilitiesVersions ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
--     SMime Capabilities Versions holds the sequence of S/MIME V3
specifications
--     understood by the client.   Currently the only two items legal values
are
--     v2 (S/MIME version 2) and v3 (S/MIME version 3).   If the item is
missing from a
--     capabilities list then V2 only should be assumed.

The current justification for this is that S/MIME V2 clients will probably
not understand the CMS encrypted data objects.  Specifically receipient
infos other than key transport and may not be able to decrypt the message at
all if other key managment algorithms are used in the message.

jim

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "'Tom Kung'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Receipt Request Attribute
Date: Mon, 10 May 1999 12:49:32 -0700
Sender: [email-masked]

Tom,

My opinion on this would be:

1.  A CounterSignature can contain a receipt request.
2.  The receipt request on the original SignedData and the receipt receipt
on the CounterSignature can be different.  The requirement is that all
receipt requests in a SignerInfo sequence be the same and a CounterSigner
has a different SignerInfo sequence

jim

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Kung [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 1999 11:48 AM
To: [email-masked]'
Subject: Receipt Request Attribute

Gooday,

I would appreciate clarification on the following with respect to the
Receipt Request attribute:

1.	May a CounterSignature contain a receipt request?

2.	If so, MUST all receipt requests in a SignedData be identical?  The
spec specifies that all Receipt Requests be identical.  Is it the intent
that CounterSignatures containing a receipt request MUST also be identical
with other receipt requests if it exists?  I don't see why each
countersignature can not have a different receipt request.

thanx,tom.

From: Tom Kung <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Receipt Request Attribute
Date: Mon, 10 May 1999 14:47:59 -0400
Sender: [email-masked]

Gooday,

I would appreciate clarification on the following with respect to the
Receipt Request attribute:

1.	May a CounterSignature contain a receipt request?

2.	If so, MUST all receipt requests in a SignedData be identical?  The
spec specifies that all Receipt Requests be identical.  Is it the intent
that CounterSignatures containing a receipt request MUST also be identical
with other receipt requests if it exists?  I don't see why each
countersignature can not have a different receipt request.

thanx,tom.

Date: Fri, 07 May 1999 16:42:42 -0700
To: [email-masked]
From: Paul Hoffman / IMC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Mailing loop problem; probably solved
Sender: [email-masked]

Hi there. Some of you have gotten multiple copies of two messages sent to 
the list. I believe we found the culprit and have fixed the problem. If you 
get multiple copies of *this* message, it means that we didn't get it fixed 
on the first round, but I'll be watching carefully.

PLEASE DO NOT RESPOND TO THE LIST ABOUT THIS; if you want to talk about it, 
please send me individual mail.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--Internet Mail Consortium

Date: Fri, 7 May 1999 14:18:40 -0400
To: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
From: [email-masked] (John Pawling)
Subject: RE: More Re: Comments on cmskea
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim,

Thank you for your concurrence.  If I do not hear any objections from
anybody by 14 May, then I will submit a new CMSKEA I-D that includes the
previously discussed recommendations.

- John Pawling

At 10:44 AM 5/7/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>John,
>
>After having worked my way through this, I think it is completely acceptable
>and should be done.  This addresses the major problem I had and make things
>more in line with the D-H items.
>
>jim
>
>

From: "Jim Schaad (Exchange)" <[email-masked]>
To: "[email-masked]'" <[email-masked]>, "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: More Re: Comments on cmskea
Date: Fri, 7 May 1999 10:44:43 -0700 
Sender: [email-masked]

John,

After having worked my way through this, I think it is completely acceptable
and should be done.  This addresses the major problem I had and make things
more in line with the D-H items.

jim

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 1999 10:36 AM
To: Ietf-Smime (E-mail)
Subject: More Re: Comments on cmskea

Jim and friends,

Please substitute "id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm" for "id-KEA" in my 
earlier message. 

Also, change the definition to: "id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm (24)}.  

- John Pawling

Previous message:
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Jim,

Thank you very much for your feedback regarding the "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK
Conventions" (CMSKEA) I-D.  I apologize for not answering your message
sooner. 

I believe that you make an excellent point that the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm
OID is overused in CMSKEA.  In fact, the situation is slightly worse than
what you describe.  I added bullet 2 to your list as follows.

1. RFC2528: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
algorithm type of the public key.  The parameters field in this case is an
OCTET STRING identifying the group parameters for the key.

2. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2, 3rd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm can be used in a
keyAgreementRecipientInfo originatorKey to identify the type of the public
key.  The parameters field in this case is an OCTET STRING identifying the
group parameters for the key.

3. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the
KeyAgreementRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the
parameters field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

4. CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in
KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters
field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

I agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para.  I don't
agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para, because it
contradicts CMS section 12.3.1 which states: "Key agreement algorithm
identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm...fields.  Key wrap algorithm
identifiers are located in the KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within the
EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm
... fields."

Recommend the following:

1) Continue to use the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID as stated in bullets 1
and 2 above. 

2) Define a new OID for use as stated in bullet 3.  Recommend the following
OID be registered in the Registry of INFOSEC Technical Objects: id-kEA
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840)
organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) kEA (23)}.  The
parameters field for this OID will be KeyWrapAlgorithm (using
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

3) As you proposed, change CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para to state that the
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID (with NULL parameters) is used in KEKRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  

Please let me know if you agree with these recommendations.  If anybody else
has comments, please let me know. If there are no objections from anybody,
then I will change the CMSKEA I-D to implement the aforementioned
recommendations and I will apply for the new id-kEA OID.

- John Pawling

At 09:37 PM 4/29/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>John,
>
>I am having a big problem with the amount of overload going on for the the
>OID id-keyExchangeAlgorithm.  It appears to be used in three unique
>locations in encoding an encrypted message and has different meanings and
>two different set of parameters.
>
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
>asymmetric algorithm.  The parameters in this case are an OCTET STRING
>identifing the group parameters for the key.
>
>2.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the KeyAgreementRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters is
>KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 as the algorithm).
>
>3.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in KEKRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case a completely different
algorithm
>is being referenced and again the parameters are KeyWrapAlgorithm.
>
>
>I strong suggest that we change this as follows:
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in certificate w/parameters and in
>KeyAgreementRecipeintInfo w/o parameters.
>
>2.  id-fortezzaWrap80 is used in KEKRecipientInfo for the KEK algorithm
>again w/o parameters are they are not needed.
>
>This should work unless we belive that there would ever be a different
>content encryption algorithm for KEA.
>
>
>jim
>
>

Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 13:36:27 -0400
To: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
From: [email-masked] (John Pawling)
Subject: More Re: Comments on cmskea
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim and friends,

Please substitute "id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm" for "id-KEA" in my 
earlier message. 

Also, change the definition to: "id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm OBJECT
IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm (24)}.  

- John Pawling

Previous message:
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Jim,

Thank you very much for your feedback regarding the "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK
Conventions" (CMSKEA) I-D.  I apologize for not answering your message sooner. 

I believe that you make an excellent point that the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm
OID is overused in CMSKEA.  In fact, the situation is slightly worse than
what you describe.  I added bullet 2 to your list as follows.

1. RFC2528: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
algorithm type of the public key.  The parameters field in this case is an
OCTET STRING identifying the group parameters for the key.

2. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2, 3rd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm can be used in a
keyAgreementRecipientInfo originatorKey to identify the type of the public
key.  The parameters field in this case is an OCTET STRING identifying the
group parameters for the key.

3. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the
KeyAgreementRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the
parameters field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

4. CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in
KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters
field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

I agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para.  I don't
agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para, because it
contradicts CMS section 12.3.1 which states: "Key agreement algorithm
identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm...fields.  Key wrap algorithm
identifiers are located in the KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within the
EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm
... fields."

Recommend the following:

1) Continue to use the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID as stated in bullets 1
and 2 above. 

2) Define a new OID for use as stated in bullet 3.  Recommend the following
OID be registered in the Registry of INFOSEC Technical Objects: id-kEA
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840)
organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) kEA (23)}.  The
parameters field for this OID will be KeyWrapAlgorithm (using
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

3) As you proposed, change CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para to state that the
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID (with NULL parameters) is used in KEKRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  

Please let me know if you agree with these recommendations.  If anybody else
has comments, please let me know. If there are no objections from anybody,
then I will change the CMSKEA I-D to implement the aforementioned
recommendations and I will apply for the new id-kEA OID.

- John Pawling

At 09:37 PM 4/29/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>John,
>
>I am having a big problem with the amount of overload going on for the the
>OID id-keyExchangeAlgorithm.  It appears to be used in three unique
>locations in encoding an encrypted message and has different meanings and
>two different set of parameters.
>
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
>asymmetric algorithm.  The parameters in this case are an OCTET STRING
>identifing the group parameters for the key.
>
>2.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the KeyAgreementRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters is
>KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 as the algorithm).
>
>3.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in KEKRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case a completely different algorithm
>is being referenced and again the parameters are KeyWrapAlgorithm.
>
>
>I strong suggest that we change this as follows:
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in certificate w/parameters and in
>KeyAgreementRecipeintInfo w/o parameters.
>
>2.  id-fortezzaWrap80 is used in KEKRecipientInfo for the KEK algorithm
>again w/o parameters are they are not needed.
>
>This should work unless we belive that there would ever be a different
>content encryption algorithm for KEA.
>
>
>jim
>
>

Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 09:50:57 -0400
To: "Ietf-Smime (E-mail)" <[email-masked]>
From: [email-masked] (John Pawling)
Subject: Re: Comments on cmskea
Sender: [email-masked]

Jim,

Thank you very much for your feedback regarding the "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK
Conventions" (CMSKEA) I-D.  I apologize for not answering your message sooner. 

I believe that you make an excellent point that the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm
OID is overused in CMSKEA.  In fact, the situation is slightly worse than
what you describe.  I added bullet 2 to your list as follows.

1. RFC2528: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
algorithm type of the public key.  The parameters field in this case is an
OCTET STRING identifying the group parameters for the key.

2. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2, 3rd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm can be used in a
keyAgreementRecipientInfo originatorKey to identify the type of the public
key.  The parameters field in this case is an OCTET STRING identifying the
group parameters for the key.

3. CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the
KeyAgreementRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the
parameters field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

4. CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para: id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in
KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters
field is KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

I agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para.  I don't
agree with your proposed change for CMSKEA, Sec 4.2.1, 4th para, because it
contradicts CMS section 12.3.1 which states: "Key agreement algorithm
identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm...fields.  Key wrap algorithm
identifiers are located in the KeyWrapAlgorithm parameters within the
EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm
... fields."

Recommend the following:

1) Continue to use the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID as stated in bullets 1
and 2 above. 

2) Define a new OID for use as stated in bullet 3.  Recommend the following
OID be registered in the Registry of INFOSEC Technical Objects: id-kEA
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840)
organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) kEA (23)}.  The
parameters field for this OID will be KeyWrapAlgorithm (using
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID).

3) As you proposed, change CMSKEA, Sec 4.3, 2nd para to state that the
id-fortezzaWrap80 OID (with NULL parameters) is used in KEKRecipientInfo
keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  

Please let me know if you agree with these recommendations.  If anybody else
has comments, please let me know. If there are no objections from anybody,
then I will change the CMSKEA I-D to implement the aforementioned
recommendations and I will apply for the new id-kEA OID.

- John Pawling

At 09:37 PM 4/29/99 -0700, Jim Schaad (Exchange) wrote:
>John,
>
>I am having a big problem with the amount of overload going on for the the
>OID id-keyExchangeAlgorithm.  It appears to be used in three unique
>locations in encoding an encrypted message and has different meanings and
>two different set of parameters.
>
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in a certificate to identify the
>asymmetric algorithm.  The parameters in this case are an OCTET STRING
>identifing the group parameters for the key.
>
>2.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in the KeyAgreementRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case the parameters is
>KeyWrapAlgorithm (using id-fortezzaWrap80 as the algorithm).
>
>3.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in KEKRecipientInfo
>keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  In this case a completely different algorithm
>is being referenced and again the parameters are KeyWrapAlgorithm.
>
>
>I strong suggest that we change this as follows:
>
>1.  id-keyExchangeAlgorithm is used in certificate w/parameters and in
>KeyAgreementRecipeintInfo w/o parameters.
>
>2.  id-fortezzaWrap80 is used in KEKRecipientInfo for the KEK algorithm
>again w/o parameters are they are not needed.
>
>This should work unless we belive that there would ever be a different
>content encryption algorithm for KEA.
>
>
>jim
>
>

Date: Tue, 04 May 1999 17:13:59 -0400
To: William Ottaway <[email-masked]>
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Charter Revision
Cc: "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Sender: [email-masked]

Sorry, yes DOMSEC document shuld be included as Experimental work.

Russ

At 03:10 PM 5/4/99 +0100, William Ottaway wrote:
>Russ,
>
>Should the domsec document be included?
>
>Bill
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From:	Russ Housley [SMTP:[email-masked]]
>Sent:	Tuesday, May 04, 1999 2:58 AM
>To:	[email-masked]
>Subject:	Charter Revision
>
>S/MIME WG:
>
>Now that the basic S/MIME v3 specifications have passed the IESG, it is
>time to update the Working Group Charter.  Several different documents
>should be included:
>
>  - Certificate Distribution (Standards track)
>  - CMS and ESS Examples (Standards track)
>  - Small Subgroup Attack (Infromational)
>  - Mail List Management (Standards track)
>  - ESS Security Labels (Informational)
>  - KEA & SKIPJACK Algorithms (Informational)
>  - IDEA Algorithm (Informational)
>
>Would the proponent for each area please provide me with a few sentences
>for the updated Charter and the milestones.
>
>Are there any topics that I omitted?
>
>Russ

From: William Ottaway <[email-masked]>
To: "'Russ Housley'" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: RE: Charter Revision
Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 15:10:49 +0100
Sender: [email-masked]

Russ,

Should the domsec document be included?

Bill

-----Original Message-----
From:	Russ Housley [SMTP:[email-masked]]
Sent:	Tuesday, May 04, 1999 2:58 AM
To:	[email-masked]
Subject:	Charter Revision

S/MIME WG:

Now that the basic S/MIME v3 specifications have passed the IESG, it is
time to update the Working Group Charter.  Several different documents
should be included:

  - Certificate Distribution (Standards track)
  - CMS and ESS Examples (Standards track)
  - Small Subgroup Attack (Infromational)
  - Mail List Management (Standards track)
  - ESS Security Labels (Informational)
  - KEA & SKIPJACK Algorithms (Informational)
  - IDEA Algorithm (Informational)

Would the proponent for each area please provide me with a few sentences
for the updated Charter and the milestones.

Are there any topics that I omitted?

Russ

Date: Mon, 03 May 1999 21:58:17 -0400
To: [email-masked]
From: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Charter Revision
Sender: [email-masked]

S/MIME WG:

Now that the basic S/MIME v3 specifications have passed the IESG, it is
time to update the Working Group Charter.  Several different documents
should be included:

  - Certificate Distribution (Standards track)
  - CMS and ESS Examples (Standards track)
  - Small Subgroup Attack (Infromational)
  - Mail List Management (Standards track)
  - ESS Security Labels (Informational)
  - KEA & SKIPJACK Algorithms (Informational)
  - IDEA Algorithm (Informational)

Would the proponent for each area please provide me with a few sentences
for the updated Charter and the milestones.

Are there any topics that I omitted?

Russ

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From: Peter Sylvester <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 1 May 1999 18:18:15 +0200
To: [email-masked]
Subject: RE: nonRepudiation key usage in SSL and S/MIME
Sender: [email-masked]

> Pleased to see someone else bring this up; I've just been writing
> some documentation on our new S/MIME 3 toolkit, from a position of
> relative unfamiliarity with the ESS services, and this really stuck
> out like a sore thumb for me. I think it may have been an error to
> put the automatic generation of receipts as a MUST without addressing
> this problem. It may be worth raising on the list, despite the late
> stage we're at in the proceedings.
> 
Sending receipts in an automatic way is a strange implemenation.
The problem is at 15 years old, and lot's of text has been
written about it.

In the model that was borrowed from X.420, nothiing is said about
when a receipt is generated. In any case, a receipt notification
is just a specially formatted message. people have fortunalety
given up to specify requirement about when these things should be
generated. 

The common misunderstanding is that people talk about
'read notification' and an analogy of the postal service with 
registered letters with receipt. 

It is understandable that such a kind of service may be desirable,
but then the underlying model is wrong. The postal service just gives
the originator an indication that some letter has been received
but nothing about the contents.  

IMHO a receipt is a conscious act from a user who wants to indicate
the reception/refusal of a message; the creation of a receipt is by no
means related to the action of reading a message for the first time.
At any time a user should be able to generate or not a receipt. 
Whether the receipt has just informational character or more 
depends on the context. 

If one reads carefully the ess text, a lot is about about 'validation'
of the receipt request. This validation includes what? At least, the
validation of the 'signatures' on the receipt request, thus all kinds
of certificate path handling etc; a local policy can decide, we don't
accept signatures from anyone on these types of messages. 

Validation of a signature does not necessarily occur at reading time.
This should also be a conscious act of the user, since it may
involve network interactions (OCSP calls or others). 

And also: SPAM, SPAM, SPAM. 

If I had to use a tool kit that generates such a stuff,
the first thing would be to stop my outgoing mail, and delete the
stuff before it gets sent.

Inside a closed environment that uses a mail based application, the
situation may be different, but in this case it should still be
the application that decides when and how to create a receipt, and
never whatever an underlying mail tool kit as an automatic result
of a transfer of the message to the application. 

Of course, some may have a another philosophy. :-) 

The type of certificate used is still another question. 

Peter